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Margaret H. Lemos† and Alex Stein†† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Consider a standard rule that sets cars’ speed limit at fifty-
five miles per hour. To implement this rule, police dispatch ra-
dar-equipped patrols to highways. The patrolling officers can-
not stop every speeding vehicle. Instead, they stop only those 
cars whose speed is conspicuously above the limit. The “con-
spicuously above” criterion varies from one case to another: a 
speeding driver sometimes becomes conspicuous by exceeding 
the limit by ten miles, while in other cases the going rate is sev-
enty-five miles per hour. Either way, the police keep their “con-
spicuously above” criterion unannounced. 
Drivers exceeding the speed limit consequently become mo-
tivated not to drive their cars conspicuously fast. When the 
speed of sixty miles per hour makes a driver conspicuous rela-
tive to other drivers on the same road, the driver will drive her 
car below that speed. The benefit from not being an outlier will 
motivate every driver to slow down. This speed-reduction 
process will stop at a point at which the driver becomes confi-
dent about other drivers’ prevalent speed. This point can be set 
at sixty-five, sixty, or even fifty-five miles per hour and may 
depend on the traffic conditions, the police patrols’ visibility, or 
on an individual driver’s ability to count on other drivers’ 
speed. The drivers’ collective speed reduction will likely be sig-
nificant. Most important, this social benefit will be achieved at 
an affordable cost. 
This way of enforcing the law, identified in this Article as a 
“strategic” model of enforcement, is suitable for a wide variety 
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of areas. The key element of the strategic model is the dynamic 
this Article refers to as “cascaded retreat,” which unfolds as fol-
lows: A concentrated enforcement effort that targets high-end 
violations induces violators not to be on the high end. Violators 
know that they will avoid punishment if their violations do not 
stand out as rampant relative to what other violators do. This 
knowledge motivates violators to reduce the intensity of their 
unlawful activity from the high-end zone to the inconspicuous 
level. Crucially, each violator does not know the extent to which 
other violators will downscale their unlawful activity, and even 
when violators communicate their plans to each other, they 
cannot fully trust each other. The violator thus must rely on his 
own judgment in estimating the extent to which other violators 
will reduce the volume of their unlawful activities. Aware of the 
fact that other violators’ calculations will be similar to his, he 
will have to cut back on his unlawful activities in order not to 
lose the downscaling contest. Every other violator will do the 
same, and the volume of illegality will shrink.  
This process will repeat itself a number of times. After 
learning that law enforcers only target high-end violators and 
let all others go unpunished, many violators will decide to leave 
the high-end zone. This exodus will make those who remain in 
that zone more conspicuous than before, which will increase 
those violators’ probability of being apprehended and punished. 
The consequent increase in the violators’ expected penalty—the 
amount of the fine or other penalty, multiplied by the probabili-
ty of apprehension—will induce some of them to downscale 
their unlawful activities. This new exit will further increase the 
remaining violators’ conspicuousness and the corresponding 
prospect of being apprehended and punished. Consequently, 
some of those violators will find staying in the high-end zone 
too risky and will begin their exit as well. This downscaling 
process will continue until violators reach a uniform level of un-
lawful activity that they are collectively unwilling to reduce. 
This activity level will mark the safe-harbor zone in which vi-
olators will stay with impunity. The law enforcers will not en-
force the law against these low-end violators. Instead, they will 
concentrate their enforcement effort on apprehending and pun-
ishing the outliers who violate the law rampantly. This dynam-
ic will reduce the volume of the violators’ unlawful activity both 
significantly and at a relatively low cost.1  
 
 1. Violators’ aversion to risk will exacerbate this dynamic. See infra note 
36 and accompanying text. 
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If strategic enforcement seems familiar, it should. As the 
driving example suggests, police and other public law enforcers 
already follow the strategic model whenever they concentrate 
their efforts on apprehending and punishing the worst offend-
ers. And strategic enforcement is simply the converse of a 
common way of awarding benefits. The highest bidder wins the 
auction, the fastest runner wins the race, the team with the 
highest score wins the game, and so forth. In these contexts—
and in many more—benefits are determined by a performance-
based (or other) comparison among similarly situated actors, 
rather than by a fixed standard.  
Although the advantages of relative performance measures 
are well recognized in the economic accounts of tournaments,2 
scholars have failed to consider the applicability of a similar 
approach to legal penalties.3 Instead, the conventional law-and-
economics wisdom centers on two enforcement models that this 
Article identifies as “comprehensive” and “randomized.” Under 
the comprehensive model, law enforcers try to apprehend and 
penalize every violation of the law. This model is expensive to 
implement, and the returns from the law enforcers’ efforts—
deterrence, remediation, and other enforcement benefits—do 
not always justify the costs.4 To fix this problem, law enforcers 
are often advised to use the randomized model of enforcement.5 
They are told to enforce the law randomly on a relatively small 
number of occasions, but impose heightened penalties on the 
apprehended violators.6 Those penalties are supposed to offset 
 
 2. For a seminal account of the tournament theory as applied to workers 
in a firm, see Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments 
as Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981). For a summary of 
existing tournament models, see Kenneth J. McLaughlin, Aspects of Tourna-
ment Models: A Survey, 9 RES. LAB. ECON. 225 (1988). 
 3. The uniqueness of our strategic model’s tournament can possibly ac-
count for this failure. Under this model, actors will engage in a never-ending se-
ries of negative-prize tournaments that can be won simultaneously by all of them. 
 4. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 563–64 (6th ed. 
2003) (noting that the cost of a law-enforcement process must always be justi-
fied by the process’s benefits).  
 5. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 
§ 9.3, at 244 (2004) (arguing that an apprehended wrongdoer’s penalty must 
be enhanced to reflect wrongdoers’ general chance to escape liability). 
 6. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180–85 (1968) (identifying enforcement costs 
associated with attempts to increase the probability of conviction and outlin-
ing the need to enhance punishments accordingly); Richard Craswell, Damage 
Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 466 (1996) (out-
lining the strategy of increasing sanctions and decreasing enforcement);  
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the diluted deterrence brought about by the reduced rate and 
correspondingly reduced probability of enforcement.7 Ex ante, 
prospective violators will expect to receive roughly the same 
penalty as under the comprehensive model. This prospect will 
adequately deter violators at a relatively low cost to society.8 
Yet, neither of these models is effective in all situations. 
Society often cannot afford, or is unwilling to incur, the expend-
itures demanded by the comprehensive model. And applying 
this model with a severely limited budget will sacrifice its ad-
vantages. When enforcement efforts are underfunded, law en-
forcers will fail to apprehend all or most offenders, and courts 
and agencies will commit many errors in enforcing the law.  
The randomized model is cheap, but so is the justice that it 
delivers. Application of this model will engender inequities that 
are morally indefensible. Under this model, small-time viola-
tors will often receive harsh punishments while rampant and 
more sophisticated wrongdoers go scot free.9 The model’s deter-
rence capacity cannot always be trusted either. By allowing law 
enforcers to seek penalties in just a few cases out of many, the 
model will incentivize them to concentrate their efforts on easy 
cases: ones that involve violators whose liability can be estab-
lished without much difficulty. The law enforcers’ incentive not 
to work hard will drive them away from sophisticated violators 
who are both able and willing to conceal their misdeeds. These 
violators consequently will acquire a practical immunity 
against prosecutions, while the law enforcers go after and im-
pose harsh penalties upon small-time offenders. This non-
 
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages, in 3 THE NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 192, 192–95 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, NEW PALGRAVE 
DICTIONARY] (explaining the need for punitive damages to create “optimal 
damages when injurers might escape liability”); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 870, 
887–96 (1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages] (discussing 
the need for enhancing damages in cases where an injurer has a chance of es-
caping liability). For a discussion of over-enforcement of the law, see Richard 
A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743 (2005) (iden-
tifying instances of unavoidable overenforcement of the law and demonstrat-
ing how it can be counteracted by evidentiary and procedural requirements 
that make liability less likely). 
 7. See Becker, supra note 6, at 180–84; Polinsky & Shavell, NEW 
PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra note 6, at 193–94. 
 8. See Becker, supra note 6, at 184. 
 9. See infra Part I.A. and text accompanying notes 159–63. 
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random consequence will defeat the very purpose of the ran-
domized model of enforcement.10 
Given the limitations to the comprehensive and random-
ized models of enforcement, policymakers should consider the 
adoption of the strategic model whenever it outperforms the 
two conventional models. The conditions that make one of the 
three models operationally superior vary across different areas 
of the law and depend on society’s investment in law enforce-
ment. Policymakers need to be mindful of all these factors 
when they choose the right model, and the goal here is to facili-
tate this understanding.  
This Article establishes a framework for choosing the ap-
propriate model of law enforcement. Part I describes the defin-
ing characteristics of the two conventional models of law en-
forcement—comprehensive and randomized—and presents the 
strategic model. Part II develops a stylized prototype of that 
model’s operation: a situation where the lawmaker promotes 
consumer protection by forcing car sellers into a full cascaded 
retreat. This prototype reverses the classic microeconomic 
“market for lemons” paradigm.11 Part III moves to the real 
world to discuss three important areas of the law—
antidiscrimination, election districting, and copyright—in 
which the strategic model can outperform the two conventional 
models of enforcement. Through these illustrations, Part III 
demonstrates that the strategic model works best when a rela-
tive measure of wrongdoing is easier to establish than an abso-
lute one, and where a potential violator must commit to a 
course of action without credible information about other viola-
tors’ behavior and strategies. A short conclusion follows. 
I.  THREE MODELS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT   
A. COMPREHENSIVE AND RANDOMIZED MODELS 
Academics and policymakers have formed a remarkable 
consensus about law enforcement. This consensus recognizes 
two basic models of enforcing the law. Under the comprehen-
sive model, law enforcers (public or private) investigate every 
violation they become aware of and bring suspected violators to 
 
 10. See infra Part I.A.  
 11. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty 
and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489–90 (1970) (describing how 
“lemons” are capable of driving quality cars out of a market because of buyers’ 
inability to determine car quality before purchasing). 
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courts or agencies for adjudication.12 Adjudicators, in turn, de-
termine whether the law was actually broken and impose pen-
alties upon violators.13 This model is effective when the benefits 
from enforcing the law are greater than the costs of investigat-
ing, identifying, and proving violations. When the enforcement 
costs get disproportionately high, the model becomes ineffec-
tual, if not altogether inapplicable, because enforcers can pur-
sue only a fraction of offenders. Furthermore, society is often 
unable or unwilling to commit a large portion of its limited re-
sources to law enforcement. When society underfunds courts 
and agencies, it weakens their ability to enforce the law both 
accurately and expeditiously. Underfunded courts and agencies 
face a choice: they must either slow their enforcement efforts 
down or compromise on accuracy. Private litigation can pick up 
some of the slack in public enforcement, but high costs discou-
rage private efforts, too, especially when the benefits of litiga-
tion are low or uncertain.14 In either scenario, the comprehen-
sive model of enforcement will not work properly and will 
systematically fail to deliver the desired results. The number of 
cases in which law enforcers will fail to enforce the law or adju-
dicators will enforce it erroneously will go up. This number will 
increase in parallel with the shortfall in society’s funding of law 
enforcement.15  
These constraints explain the presence of the randomized 
enforcement model, under which law enforcers apprehend and 
punish violators randomly and only once in a while, but the  
penalty is increased to offset the benefit that violators expect to 
derive from their ex ante prospect of not being caught.16 For 
 
 12. This Article uses the term “law enforcers” to capture the various ac-
tors who may play a role in uncovering and prosecuting violations. These may 
include local police officers, federal agencies, and—where a private civil action 
is available—private parties. In some cases, the same institution may engage 
in both law enforcement and adjudication; for example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency has the authority to investigate and sanction offenses. In 
other cases, law enforcers will have to persuade a separate institution, usually 
a court, to impose penalties. 
 13. This Article uses the term “penalties” in a broad sense that includes 
compensatory awards that successful plaintiffs recover from defendants. 
 14. See Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming Feb. 2011) (explaining that private enforcement will be limited 
when the costs of litigation outweigh the expected benefits to the plaintiff ). 
 15. See Becker, supra note 6, at 174. 
 16. See supra note 6. For an application of this principle to the civil set-
ting, see Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that optimal deterrence is achieved when damages equal the harm 
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example, when the regular fine for a violation is $10,000, but 
law enforcers apprehend only one violator out of three, the fine 
for every convicted violator should be set at $30,000. The ex-
pected fine for prospective violators would then be $10,000: the 
same amount as the regular fine. The increased penalty that 
violators receive under the randomized model always equals 
the regular penalty amount (P) divided by the probability of en-
forcement. This probability is determined by the fraction of 
cases in which violators are actually punished (1/f ). The height-
ened penalty for convicted violators consequently equals f×P—a 
formulation that underscores the crucial role of penalty multip-
liers (f ).17 Those multipliers set the expected penalty for pros-
pective violators at the optimal amount (P). This adjustment 
offsets the incentive to break the law created by the gap be-
tween the complete and incomplete enforcement.18 
The accepted wisdom holds that the legal system should 
coordinate its use of those two models. Specifically, the system 
should apply the comprehensive model within its budget and 
up to the point of diminishing returns.19 After reaching this 
point, the system should switch to the randomized model. The 
randomized model compensates for shortfalls in law enforce-
ment with a strike of a pen: instead of making a costly effort at 
apprehending violators on the ground, the model increases 
their penalty on paper. To make the threat of the increased  
penalty credible, law enforcers and adjudicators still need to 
apprehend and punish a sufficient number of violators. Failure 
to do so would erode the threat’s credibility. The legal system 
therefore still needs to invest substantial resources in law en-
forcement. However, the system becomes able to support itself 
with a partial enforcement and ration its effort at enforcing the 
law in an economically sensible way. This rationing is the main 
advantage of the randomized model.20 
 
done divided by the probability that the wrongdoing will be detected and the 
plaintiff will prosecute a damages claim). 
 17. See Becker, supra note 6, at 183. 
 18. See United States v. Elliott, 467 F.3d 688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2006) (ap-
plying the multiplier method in meting out criminal punishment); Becker, su-
pra note 6, at 180–84; Polinsky & Shavell, NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY, supra 
note 6, at 193–94; see also Parks v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 398 F.3d 
937, 943 (7th Cir. 2005) (“One of the purposes of punitive damages is to punish 
a defendant who might otherwise find that its behavior was cost-effective.” 
(citing Polinsky & Shavell, Punitive Damages, supra note 6, at 887)). 
 19. See POSNER, supra note 4, at 563–64. 
 20. See Becker, supra note 6, at 184. 
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The randomized model enters the scene when comprehen-
sive enforcement of the law costs the legal system too much. 
The system encounters this problem in cases involving covert 
violations of the law that are difficult to uncover. Antitrust vi-
olations, punishable by treble damages,21 are probably the best 
example of cases falling into this category. Other examples in-
clude violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act,22 the Antiterrorism Act,23 the rule prohibiting 
submission of false claims for payment to a federal agency,24 
and the requirement that banks limit their activities to bank-
ing.25 These and some other26 violations of the law are punish-
able by treble damages.  
The legal system also encounters the excessive-cost prob-
lem in cases where there is a substantial disparity of power be-
tween plaintiffs and defendants. Cases falling into this category 
involve violations of consumers’ rights,27 tenant abuse,28 em-
bezzlement of a client’s money by her attorney,29 and other 
misdeeds.30 Suits filed in connection with those violations are 
extremely difficult to win because of the defendant’s formidable 
litigation resources that plaintiffs cannot match. As a result, 
only a small number of deserving plaintiffs file and prosecute 
suits against violators. One way of addressing this problem is 
 
 21. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006). 
 22. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006). 
 23. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006) (entitling victims of international terrorism 
to recover from a liable defendant “threefold the damages he or she sustains”). 
 24. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 25. Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841, 1975 (2006). 
 26. See, e.g., Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(b) (2006) (providing for treble 
damages for use of a counterfeit trademark); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 284 
(2006) (providing for treble damages for willful patent infringement). 
 27. See Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1693(f )(e) (2006). 
 28. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-35 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Leg-
is. Sess.) (allowing tenant to recover treble damages for landlord’s improper 
withholding of rent deposit). 
 29. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 221, § 51 (West, Westlaw through 
2010 Legis. Sess.) (“An attorney at law who unreasonably neglects to pay over 
money collected by him for and on behalf of a client, when demanded by the 
client, shall forfeit to such client five times the lawful interest of the money 
from the time of the demand.”). 
 30. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85J (West, Westlaw 
through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (“Whoever, by deceit or fraud, sells personal prop-
erty shall be liable in tort to a purchaser in treble the amount of damages sus-
tained by him.”). 
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to subsidize suits.31 Another way is to ration the enforcement 
effort by accepting the fact that only a small proportion of the 
violations will be remedied, while increasing the violators’ pen-
alty in order not to dilute deterrence. Both solutions call for an 
introduction of a special rule promising multiple-damage 
awards or other incentives to successful plaintiffs.32 
The randomized model has a number of shortcomings. 
Chief of those is the model’s limited scope. This model operates 
effectively when a monetary award adequately deters the 
wrongdoer and compensates the victim. These effects will be 
achieved in most, but not all, cases. In many instances, the only 
available enforcement measure is an injunction rather than 
compensation or fine. Monetary damages may be inadequate 
where the primary goal of the suit is to change the specific de-
fendant’s action. More importantly, when the relevant offend-
ers are state actors, a monetary award may be legally unavail-
able even where it is appropriate.33 Because prospective 
injunctive relief cannot be multiplied to adjust for the fraction 
of violators who are punished, randomized enforcement will re-
sult in insufficient deterrence in these circumstances.  
Another deficiency of the randomized model is distributive 
injustice. Under this model, the legal system systematically 
imposes harsh penalties on a relatively small number of viola-
tors and lets all others go scot free. Worse yet, because law en-
forcers and adjudicators choose this small number of violators 
from a large pool of suspects, they have an incentive to enforce 
the law only in easy cases in which violations can easily be 
proven. This selective targeting allows wealthy and sophisti-
cated violators to avoid detection and sanction by taking meas-
ures that make the enforcers’ task difficult to carry out. 
Finally, by substituting enhanced damages in a few cases 
for enforcement in a higher number of cases, the randomized 
model can undermine the norm-building function of the law. 
The goals of law enforcement and adjudication are not always 
confined to compensating victims and deterring future offenses. 
Enforcement events also play an expressive role, branding cer-
tain conduct as blameworthy and entrenching beneficial social 
 
 31. See Lemos, supra note 14 (discussing plaintiff-side attorneys’ fee shifts 
and multiple and punitive damages). 
 32. Id. 
 33. See infra notes 136–37 and accompanying text. 
  
18 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:9 
 
norms.34 This important goal limits the system’s ability to ra-
tion its enforcement efforts. 
B. STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT 
The comprehensive and randomized models of law en-
forcement are indispensable policy tools.35 However, they are 
not the only models available to the legal system. The conven-
tional understanding of the law enforcement options ignores a 
third possibility: the model of strategic enforcement. This mod-
el concentrates the enforcement effort on the worst violators. 
Under this model, law enforcers enforce the law only against 
violators identified as the worst at the time of enforcement. The 
law enforcers tolerate the average and small-time infringers so 
long as they stay away from the “worst” category. As this sec-
tion explains, a strategic enforcement strategy produces a so-
cially beneficial dynamic—a cascaded retreat from high-end vi-
olations—that allows law enforcers to economize on 
enforcement costs while avoiding the distortions associated 
with the conventional models.  
Strategic enforcement works as follows. A concentrated en-
forcement effort that exclusively targets the worst violators in-
creases their probability of being apprehended and punished. 
Moreover, while rampant violators face a high expected penal-
ty, all other violators are largely risk-free. This punishment dif-
ferential will induce violators to constrain their activities in or-
der to avoid becoming conspicuous. Under the comprehensive 
model, by contrast, some violators prefer to violate the law 
rampantly instead of staying in or below the average. To see 
why, consider a legal regime that imposes a $5000 fine on av-
erage violators and doubles the fine when a violator qualifies as 
“rampant” or “the worst.” Assume for simplicity that the proba-
bility of apprehension is 0.5 for all violators. Under this set of 
facts, by moving from the “average” to the “worst” category, a 
violator will add $2500 to his expected penalty. Consequently, a 
 
 34. See generally Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 585, 585–86 (1988) (developing an economic theory of expressive 
law and emphasizing the role of courts in expressing social values); Dan M. 
Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349, 
350–51 (1997) (articulating a social-influence account of criminal law that fo-
cuses on the law’s power to change behavior by influencing values and the 
formation of preferences); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of 
Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024–25 (1996) (exploring “the function of law 
in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly”). 
 35. See supra Part I.A. 
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violator will upgrade his unlawful activity from “average” to 
“worst” whenever his expected benefit exceeds $2500. 
The strategic model eliminates this perverse incentive. 
Under this model, average and below-average violations are 
considered tolerable and go unpunished. Conspicuous violators, 
on the other hand, face a near-certainty (say, a ninety percent 
chance) of punishment. As a result, an average violator’s tran-
sition to the “worst” category costs him $9000, as opposed to 
just $2500. An average violator consequently will avoid this 
transition even when he stands to gain $8900 from breaking 
the law. 
Under the strategic model, violators will not downscale 
their unlawful activities just once. Rather, they will do so re-
peatedly. This cascaded retreat will be forced out by the model’s 
most crucial element: its self-adjusting comparative identifica-
tion of the worst violators. More specifically, under the strate-
gic model, the “worst” status will attach to violators occupying 
the upper end of the unlawfulness scale. The boundaries of this 
category will be dynamic. For example, when most drivers 
breaking the fifty-five miles per hour speed limit drive their 
cars at sixty-three miles per hour, a person who drives her ve-
hicle at seventy miles per hour will fall into the “worst” catego-
ry. This person could have escaped the “worst” categorization if 
the majority of the speeding drivers drove their cars at roughly 
the same speed as hers, with some highly reckless drivers driv-
ing their vehicles at eighty miles per hour. But because no oth-
er drivers actually drove at eighty miles per hour, the person 
driving at seventy miles per hour is an outlier—the status that 
makes her eligible for a penalty that will be imposed with a 
high probability. The strategic model penalizes outliers because 
they are outliers. This strategy incentivizes violators not to be 
in the outlier position at any given point in time.  
The strategic model will authorize law enforcers to identify 
outliers—the worst violators—by the extent to which they 
break the relevant legal rule relative to other violators. Criteria 
for appraising this comparative egregiousness will vary with 
legal context, and could include the number of violations, the 
amount of the violator’s ill-gotten gain, and the magnitude of 
harm he caused to the victim and society at large. Policymakers 
will be free to combine these factors and rank their relative 
significance as they deem appropriate.  
Because strategic enforcement employs a relative measure 
of wrongdoing, its comparative procedure for identifying out-
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liers induces competition among violators as each tries to avoid 
being “the worst.” This competition will lead to the violators’ 
cascaded retreat. Each violator will try to bring his unlawful 
activity down to the second-worst level. Anticipating that other 
violators will do the same, he will try to outplay them by reduc-
ing the level of his activity again and again until he reaches a 
point where he is confident that he will not be exposed as an 
outlier. The violators’ collective efforts will repeatedly reduce 
the volume of the unlawful activity. In theory, this process may 
eradicate the activity completely. More realistically, the process 
will be discontinued at a certain level of the unlawful activity 
that most violators perceive as a safe harbor. 
For risk-averse violators, the certainty of the safe harbor 
will often be more valuable than an uncertain gain from a pun-
ishable violation. Thus, if a violator stands to gain $10,000 
from an average or below-average violation and his expected 
gain from a rampant violation is $15,000, the violator’s aver-
sion toward risk might induce him to opt for the sure gain of 
$10,000. Whether it will happen or not depends on the intensi-
ty of the violator’s aversion to risk. This factor will vary from 
one violator to another.  
The aggregate effect of the violators’ risk-aversion, howev-
er, will be systematic. Risk-averse violators will always try to 
keep their activities as close as possible to the safe-harbor zone. 
All other violators will anticipate this strategy and the conse-
quent reduction of the tolerated volume of unlawfulness. Every 
violator will tend to reduce the volume of his unlawful activity 
in order not to fall into the “worst” category.36 The socially 
beneficial change in the behavior of risk-averse violators will 
therefore affect the behavior of all violators, including those 
who are not risk-averse. The overall effect of the strategic mod-
el’s implementation will be an entrenchment of conduct that 
society can tolerate as minimally offensive or, at worst, has to 
put up with on account of scarce resources. 
In sum, the strategic model offers an approach to law en-
forcement that avoids the pitfalls of the conventional enforce-
 
 36. Cf. James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)Reasonable Care, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (2008) (identifying the “doctrinal feedback” dynamic 
where overcautious doctors’ excessive precautions against harm cyclically 
transform into legally binding customs); James Gibson, Risk Aversion and 
Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 884–906 
(2007) (identifying an unceasing expansion of copyright owners’ rights at the 
expense of risk-averse users who prefer to pay the owner a license fee rather 
than risk litigation). 
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ment models. In contrast to the comprehensive model, strategic 
enforcement deters unlawful activity without requiring law en-
forcers to apprehend and sanction all or most offenders. In-
stead, like the randomized model, strategic enforcement lowers 
enforcement costs by targeting only a subset of violators. But 
while randomized enforcement creates incentives for law en-
forcers to focus on easy cases while the worst offenders go free, 
the strategic model focuses exclusively on the worst of the 
worst. The result, as explained above, will be a cascaded retreat 
away from illegal activity as violators compete with each other 
to avoid the outlier status.37  
The remainder of this Article illustrates how the strategic 
model of enforcement can work in diverse areas of the law. Part 
II begins with a stylized example of consumer protection, based 
on one of the classics of microeconomic theory. Part III takes up 
three real-world cases where neither the comprehensive nor the 
randomized model has succeeded, and shows how the compara-
 
 37. Our tournament-based system of enforcing the law is not the only 
method of economizing law enforcers’ efforts. Another method is “dynamic con-
centration.” See MARK A.R. KLEIMAN, WHEN BRUTE FORCE FAILS: HOW TO 
HAVE LESS CRIME AND LESS PUNISHMENT 49–65 (2009). This method’s proto-
typical example features a Texas Ranger facing an angry mob that wants to 
lynch a prisoner inside the jail, whom the Ranger must protect. The Ranger is 
down to one bullet in his revolver, and the mob knows it. The Ranger, none-
theless, saves the prisoner by shouting at the mob, “Whoever takes the first 
step forward, dies.” Id. at 55. The Ranger’s success flows from his ability to 
rein in a subset of mobsters by threatening to shoot one of them, thereby free-
ing up a new enforcement capacity that deters other mobsters. This method of 
enforcing the law can be particularly effective against drug gangs. See id. at 
176–77. For an innovative and insightful application of the “dynamic concen-
tration” method, see generally Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights 
Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1 (2009). This article fo-
cuses on the implementation of 42 U.S.C. § 14141(a), which authorizes the 
Department of Justice to sue police departments for unconstitutional police 
misconduct. To improve this provision’s implementation, Professor Harmon 
urges the Department of Justice to target large police departments, to “gener-
ate and publish a list of departments it has reason to believe are engaged in 
the worst wrongdoing,” to “sue those departments in which investigation con-
firms serious systemic misconduct,” and to “publicly adopt the policy of re-
fraining from investigating or suing any department that adopts . . . a set of 
standardized remedial measures” that the Department of Justice will deter-
mine in advance. Harmon, supra, at 4, 26, 37–38. These measures will induce 
many police departments to get off the blacklist by implementing the requisite 
remedial measures. Id. at 38–39. Under this system, the law enforcer sets the 
concentration dynamic in motion by making a credible commitment as to what 
violations it will and will not prosecute. Under our model, no such commit-
ment is necessary. Rather, our model forces violators into a competitive self-
selection process that will determine the inconspicuous—and hence toler-
ated—level of unlawful behavior. 
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tive focus of strategic enforcement might improve enforcement 
in each case.  
II.  STRATEGIC ENFORCEMENT AS A MARKET FOR 
ANTILEMONS   
This Part presents a stylized prototype of strategic en-
forcement. The goal is to identify the conditions under which 
this model operates at its best and outperforms the two conven-
tional models of enforcement. To this end, this Part revisits the 
classic “market for lemons” theory that establishes the impos-
sibility of consumer protection in a nonregulated market.38 In 
so doing, it shows how the adoption of the strategic model can 
set up comprehensive consumer protection at a socially afford-
able cost. 
The “market for lemons” scenario features sellers of used 
cars who cannot credibly inform potential buyers about the 
quality of their cars.39 When no other credible information is 
available, buyers cannot discriminate among used cars. Conse-
quently, they will pay no more than the average price for any 
car offered for sale.40 Sellers who know that their cars are high 
quality but cannot support their true claims about the value of 
those cars will face skepticism from buyers. Car buyers, in 
turn, will ignore unsubstantiated claims because dishonest car 
sellers can replicate those claims as well. Owners of the best 
used cars may therefore decide not to sell them. Removal of 
those cars from the market will reduce the average quality and 
price of secondhand cars. Faced with this situation, owners of 
the second-best used cars may also decide not to sell their cars, 
thus dragging the average car quality and price further down. 
This process will repeat itself until the market turns into a 
“market for lemons,” offering only the poorest quality cars.41 
To illustrate, consider a market offering for sale three 
types of used cars in equal numbers: the best, the second-best, 
and the worst (the “lemons”). Buyers are willing to pay $18,000 
for a best-quality car, $10,000 for a second-best car, and $2000 
 
 38. See Akerlof, supra note 11, at 488–500. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 489. 
 41. Id.; see also Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence 
Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 458–61 (2000) (applying the “lemons” model to 
fact finders’ evaluations of self-exonerating accounts of criminal suspects and 
defendants). 
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for a “lemon.” However, none of the buyers is able to ascertain a 
car’s quality. The buyers consequently offer each seller the av-
erage car value: $10,000. This offer is way below the best cars’ 
value, which prompts owners of those cars to remove them from 
the market. The market subsequently offers two types of cars: 
the second-best cars—that turn into the best—and the “lem-
ons.” The average price that buyers offer to the sellers corre-
spondingly goes down to $6000. The price is far below the value 
of the second-best cars. Owners of those cars consequently have 
no choice but to remove them from the market. As a result, the 
only cars that remain on the market are the “lemons.”  
To avoid this socially harmful consequence, the state can 
set up a legal mechanism that will allow—or even require—car 
sellers to give warranties upon which buyers can rely. Buyers 
will then be willing to pay $18,000 for cars advertised as “best 
quality.” To make this mechanism work, courts would have to 
enforce every warranty accurately and expeditiously. This is 
what the comprehensive model attempts to do. Under this 
model, courts will have to provide both prompt and accurate 
resolutions to numerous disputes between buyers and sellers of 
used cars. This model will consequently be costly to implement 
(but the expenditure might still be worthwhile). 
As an alternative measure, the state may devise a cheaper 
system of enforcement. This system will punish breaches of 
warranty only once in a while, but the punishment for appre-
hended violators will be harsh. The expected punishment will 
be set high enough to deter unscrupulous sellers of used cars. 
This economized deterrence is what the randomized model tries 
to achieve. The model achieves this deterrence by creating a 
distortion in the distribution of legal penalties and remedies. 
Under this model, numerous violators will go free while many 
deserving plaintiffs are denied a remedy. Over time, however, 
this distortion will supposedly disappear. Theoretically, the 
prospect of harsh punishment will induce all violators not to 
break the law.42  
The strategic model offers the state a third enforcement 
mechanism. This model imposes highly probable harsh penal-
ties on the worst violators of car-selling warranties—those who 
overprice their cars by the largest margin—and abstains from 
enforcing the law against other infringers. This system will ex-
ploit asymmetrical information: the fact that one violator can-
 
 42. See KLEIMAN, supra note 37, at 81. 
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not predict and rely upon other violators’ behavior. This infor-
mational asymmetry will force violators to compete against 
each other over whose conduct avoids being the worst.  
This competition will force the violators into a cascaded re-
treat. Assume again that all sellers begin by advertising their 
cars as “best” and asking $18,000. As the sellers compete to 
avoid the outlier status, those offering “lemons” will have a 
strong incentive to give buyers more accurate information 
about their cars’ quality. At any given point in time, each seller 
will try to outperform its competitors in order to avoid being 
identified as the worst violator. This dynamic will reduce the 
asking price of a “lemon” car to $2000 (or a close amount). Be-
cause a “lemon” owner is unaware of other car sellers’ strate-
gies, it will be too risky for him to ask for any price that sub-
stantially exceeds $2000.43 
Anticipating the “lemon” owners’ new pricing, sellers of 
second-best cars will be reluctant to pass their cars off as best-
quality cars. Any such misrepresentation might fall into the 
“worst” category and make the seller eligible for the penalty. 
Whether it will happen depends on how other sellers misrepre-
sent their second-best cars, but this information is not available 
to the seller. The seller only knows that other sellers will try to 
outperform him in informing the buyers about their cars’ quali-
ty. This competition will bring the asking price for a second-
best car down to $10,000 (or a close amount). This correct price 
will separate the second-best cars from the best, thereby trans-
forming the market for “lemons” into a market for “anti-
lemons.”  
This consequence is what the strategic model can achieve 
when it operates at its best. But the model’s best performance 
is not guaranteed. Rather, it depends upon numerous factors. 
First, the strategic model can only work properly when the vi-
olators cannot make a dependable conspiratorial agreement 
that will align their violations. When violators can coordinate 
the level of their unlawful activity, law enforcers will not 
achieve the cascaded retreat. Under such circumstances, they 
will have to choose between the comprehensive and the ran-
domized model of enforcement. 
 
 43. The “lemon” car owner will avoid taking this risk for a simple reason. 
An addition of $100 to his asking price will overprice the “lemon” and misrep-
resent the warranty by five percent, while a similar addition to the true price 
of a second-best car ($10,000) will overprice it by only one percent.  
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Most violators, however, will not be able to coordinate the 
level of their unlawful activities. Their costs of getting orga-
nized, making dependable undertakings, and preventing hold-
outs will be too high.44 Moreover, multiple actors coordinating 
an unlawful activity will often expose themselves to additional 
sanctions that include penalties for conspiracy, for antitrust vi-
olations, and for obstruction of justice.45 These additional pe-
nalties reduce the attractiveness and the probability of the vi-
olators’ cooperation.  
Second, the cascaded retreat may not eradicate all illegal 
activity. Even in the absence of conspiracy, it may stop at a cer-
tain level of infringement. For example, sellers of the second-
best cars may advertise them as “nearly as good as the finest 
cars” and set their asking prices around $16,000. They may 
adopt this uniform selling method spontaneously—without any 
prior agreement—just because it offers an attractive way to 
turn a profit. Assuming that the $2000 “lemons” are no longer 
in the pool, this selling method will prompt buyers to cap their 
offers at $14,000.46 Many, if not all, owners of the best used 
cars will consequently remove those cars from the market. The 
“market for lemons” dynamic will thus unfold once again.  
Although strategic enforcement may leave some false war-
ranties in place, the “lemons” that take over the market are not 
nearly as sour as they were in the original “market for lemons” 
case. Ideally, cars should be sold at their correct prices, and 
should be accompanied with manufacturers’ and sellers’ war-
ranties upon which buyers can depend. The legal system should 
try to achieve this desirable state of affairs. Yet, it will be ex-
pensive for law enforcers and adjudicators to enforce each and 
 
 44. For a discussion of how collusion occurs, see Ian Ayres, How Cartels 
Punish: A Structural Theory of Self-Enforcing Collusion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 
295, 296–97 (1987). 
 45. The federal conspiracy statute criminalizes agreements to commit a 
civil or criminal offense against, or to defraud, the United States. 18 U.S.C. 
§ 371 (2006). Numerous other statutes, including the Sherman Antitrust Act, 
penalize specific conspiracies. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting con-
spiracies in restraint of trade); 18 U.S.C. § 24 (2006) (defining a “federal 
health care offense” as a violation or conspiracy to violate federal health care 
law); 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2006) (prohibiting conspiracy to deprive persons of their 
civil rights); 18 U.S.C. § 286 (2006) (prohibiting conspiracy to defraud the fed-
eral government). Federal law likewise criminalizes various forms of obstruc-
tion of justice. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1521 (2006). 
 46. Buyers will settle on $14,000 as a maximum offer because they will 
not be able to distinguish between the $18,000 (best) and the $10,000 (second-
best) cars. 
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every warranty effectively. The need to avoid such costly efforts 
may turn the strategic model of law enforcement into a supe-
rior policy tool. Under this model, society would spend re-
sources only to mount a credible threat of penalty against the 
worst violators of car warranties. This threat will induce the 
socially beneficial dynamic of cascaded retreat. To avoid the 
“worst violator” status, sellers of used cars will sequentially 
improve their compliance with warranties. This improvement, 
admittedly, will not eliminate all warranty violations, but it 
will go a long way to mitigate the violations’ severity. This mit-
igation may be substantial enough to make it imprudent for so-
ciety to embark on an expensive large-scale enforcement cam-
paign against all violators.  
Third, the success of the strategic model depends on 
mounting a credible threat of penalty for the worst offenders. 
Recall that a common problem with the comprehensive ap-
proach is that violations may be difficult—and therefore expen-
sive—to expose. Where it is equally difficult to expose viola-
tions as rampant, the strategic model will be weakened 
accordingly. And, of course, where it is even more difficult to 
apply a relative performance measure than an absolute one (for 
example, when the number of violators is extraordinarily high 
and their violations are difficult to uncover), a strategic ap-
proach to enforcement will be inappropriate. 
In many cases, however, the comparative focus of the stra-
tegic model may make it easier to spot outliers than run-of-the-
mill violators. This will often be true where the standard for 
liability is vague, such as a requirement of “reasonable” or 
“good faith” effort. Suppose, for example, that lawmakers re-
placed a fifty-five mile per hour speed limit with a prohibition 
on “dangerous” driving. Focusing enforcement efforts on the 
fastest drivers at a given point in time would offer a 
straightforward way to give effect to that prohibition and avoid 
the need to determine the meaning of “dangerous” in the ab-
stract. The same will hold whenever it is difficult for policy-
makers to specify in advance what the “right” answer is in a 
given context, or to measure progress relative to that goal. Just 
as auctions can help sellers identify the right price for their 
items, comparing the behavior of similarly situated actors can 
help law enforcers identify wrongs.  
Yet, the strategic model differs from regular auctions in 
one important respect—a difference that underscores another 
advantage of the model. Regular auctions suffer from the “win-
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ner’s curse” problem: auction participants tend to reduce their 
bids out of fear that the auction’s winner will have overpaid for 
the auctioned item because her bid was an outlier compared 
with the bids of other participants. This fear leads to an under 
pricing of the seller’s item.47 The strategic model of enforcing 
the law will encounter no such problem. Under this model, an 
outlier will lose the auction instead of winning it, while the 
competition over the spots in the “safe harbor” zone can be won 
by multiple actors simultaneously. Winning the strategic mod-
el’s auction therefore is always a blessing, not a curse. 
Fourth, the strategic model will perform best when the be-
havior that will place a violator in the “worst” category is diffi-
cult to predict ex ante. Speeding drivers can see how fast other 
cars are moving and adjust their speed accordingly. Although 
strategic enforcement still can be useful in such circumstances, 
there is a risk that drivers will coordinate their behavior with-
out communicating directly. Imagine, instead, that each driver 
had to choose her speed without being able to observe the other 
cars on the road. It is in that scenario—where each potential 
violator must make a completely independent judgment about 
the level of activity that will render her an outlier—that the 
strategic model works best. 
For a real-world example, consider government’s approach 
to abusive tax avoidance. Abusive tax avoidance commonly in-
volves reporting of exaggerated expenses and other deductibles 
to a tax agency.48 To counter this practice in a comprehensive 
way, the agency must audit the taxpayers’ returns line-by-line. 
Such comprehensive auditing, however, is unrealistic. Tax 
agencies simply do not have enough personnel and resources 
for carrying it out. The agency therefore needs to find a suitable 
substitute for comprehensive enforcement. One such substitute 
is the “Discriminant Index Function” (DIF) method, used by the 
IRS.49  
This method uses a formula that assigns a score to each re-
turn based on the difference between the reported and the 
standard amounts for each type of income and deduction. The 
DIF is determined by a statistical analysis of those scores.50 
 
 47. See RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND 
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–51 (1992). 
 48. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Probably? Understanding Tax Law’s Uncertain-
ty, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1017, 1046–50 (2009). 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 1068–70 (describing the DIF method used by the IRS). 
 50. Id.  
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This analysis uses the cutoff score for identifying suspicious re-
turns. Returns with DIF scores higher than the cutoff are iden-
tified as prima facie suspicious. The IRS subsequently ex-
amines those returns individually to identify the taxpayers that 
require audit.51 The DIF formula and the cutoff score are both 
secret.52 
This secrecy is the core component of the DIF-based en-
forcement of tax laws. Taxpayers do not know—and are not 
supposed to know—the DIF formula and the cutoff score.53 All 
they know is that a high DIF score will expose their tax affairs 
to an audit and that their scores depend on the difference be-
tween their reported income and deductions and the income 
and deductions factored into the secret DIF formula as stand-
ard or normative for the given occupation or business. This dif-
ference marks a taxpayer’s return as suspicious when it scores 
high relative to other taxpayers’ returns.54 
This anticipation forces the taxpayers into cascaded re-
treat. To avoid audit, every taxpayer needs to outplay others by 
scoring less than they do on the secret DIF scale. Anticipating 
the outplay prospect, all taxpayers will take their fraudulent 
reporting down to the level they consider prevalent and, conse-
quently, inconspicuous. This dynamic, in turn, will push down 
the “standard” deductions for each category.55 Aware of the fact 
that some taxpayers will inevitably win the DIF tournament, 
each individual taxpayer will try to be outscored by others. The 
taxpayers’ uncoordinated efforts will be made under extreme 
uncertainty. Each taxpayer will try to identify the safe harbor 
of a low DIF score while he is unaware of other taxpayers’ re-
 
 51. Id. at 1068–69. 
 52. Id. 
 53. As the First Circuit has explained, “the IRS closely guards informa-
tion concerning its DIF scoring methodology because knowledge of the tech-
nique would enable an unscrupulous taxpayer to manipulate his return to ob-
tain a lower DIF score and reduce the probability of an audit.” Gillin v. IRS, 
980 F.2d 819, 822 (1st Cir. 1992). This information is confidential under 26 
U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2)(D) (2006), which exempts from disclosure “standards used 
or to be used for the selection of returns for examination, or data used or to be 
used for determining such standards.” See also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (2006) 
(providing that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to “matters 
. . . specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”); Aronson v. IRS, 973 
F.2d 962, 967 (1st Cir. 1992) (ruling that confidentiality of tax information 
under 26 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2) trumps the Freedom of Information Act). 
 54. Lawsky, supra note 48, at 1068–69.  
 55. The DIF formula is secret, but it is safe to assume that the IRS formu-
lates its norms by considering the going rates of expenses and other deduc-
tions that appear in tax returns. 
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ported deductions and income. This dynamic will reduce the 
magnitude (but not the incidence) of tax frauds.  
Taxpayers’ aversion toward risk will bring the magnitude 
of those frauds further down. Fearful of the high penalties for 
tax evasion, risk-averse taxpayers will not suffice themselves 
with a high probability of getting a low DIF score. Rather they 
will try to secure the placement of their returns in the safe 
harbor zone. These efforts will reduce the average misreported 
amounts of income and deductions for all taxpayers, thereby 
increasing the conspicuousness of aggressive tax evasions. To 
avoid this increased conspicuousness, taxpayers with no aver-
sion to risk will have no choice but to curb their fraudulent am-
bitions as well. 
This Part has used the stylized “market for lemons” scenar-
io to single out the comparative advantages of the strategic 
model, and to expose some of its limitations. Strategic enforce-
ment will not work when violators can easily coordinate their 
behavior, or when it is difficult for law enforcers to compare the 
conduct of multiple violators. Moreover, while application of the 
strategic model should reduce the overall level of violations, it 
will not necessarily stamp out all illegal activity.  
One final limitation warrants mention here. The strategic 
model will be easiest to implement in areas that feature a sin-
gle enforcer of the law, typically a governmental agency, who 
uses the available information to identify the worst offenders. 
All the illustrations thus far have involved this type of public 
enforcement of the law. The strategic model, however, also can 
work in a decentralized mode of private or multiple-agency en-
forcement. To achieve this effect, multiple enforcers must pool 
their information about violators’ misdeeds. They must dissem-
inate copies of suits, indictments, and court decisions, engage 
experts,56 and cooperate with watchdog organizations that 
monitor relevant violations. The remainder of this Article 
shows how decentralized private enforcers of the law can take 
advantage of the strategic model in real-world settings. 
III.  STRATEGIC MODEL AT WORK   
This Part uses three examples from federal law to demon-
strate in more detail the potential advantages of the strategic 
model. In two of those examples—employment discrimination 
and state legislative districting—enforcement currently follows 
 
 56. See infra note 170. 
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the comprehensive model. However, inadequate plaintiff re-
sources and difficulties of proof make truly comprehensive en-
forcement impossible in both areas, leaving many violations 
unpunished. The third example involves damages for copyright 
infringement, where the law has embraced the randomized 
model of enforcement. The randomized approach promotes de-
terrence at a low cost to enforcers, but achieves this goal in a 
way that imposes crippling compensation duties on small-time 
infringers while doing little to discourage the worst offenders. 
This Part explains how policymakers and law enforcers could 
use the strategic model to improve enforcement efforts in each 
area, focusing enforcement where it is most needed without 
raising—and in some cases reducing—the overall costs to so-
ciety. 
A. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION  
Federal law prohibits discrimination in employment on the 
basis of various protected characteristics, including race, gen-
der, national origin, religion,57 age,58 and disability.59 For the 
sake of simplicity, the discussion here will focus on racial dis-
crimination, which is barred by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964.60 Enforcement of Title VII reflects the comprehensive 
model. It relies primarily on the efforts of employees (or pros-
pective or former employees) who can sue in court to collect 
damages from employers who violate the statute.61 Congress 
has facilitated such litigation with statutory provisions that 
permit prevailing plaintiffs to recover their attorneys’ fees62 
and to collect punitive damages from employers who are shown 
to have acted with “malice or reckless indifference to the feder-
ally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”63 Despite 
these inducements, most observers agree that enforcement still 
 
 57. These four characteristics are protected by Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).  
 58. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 
(2006). 
 59. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006). 
 60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006). 
 61. For a more detailed discussion of Title VII’s enforcement mechanisms, see 
Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial 
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 384–87 (2010). 
 62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). 
 63. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2006). 
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falls far short of the ideal, in part because employment discrim-
ination allegations are notoriously difficult to prove.64  
Because Title VII prohibits discrimination “because of” 
race,65 its most straightforward application is to intentional 
discrimination—widely known as “disparate treatment.”66 A 
plaintiff alleging disparate treatment must prove not only that 
he received less favorable treatment than his white counter-
parts, but also that the defendant employer took the challenged 
action because of race and not for some permissible reason.67 
For obvious reasons, proof of discriminatory intent is hard to 
 
 64. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 
457 (2004) (explaining that employment-discrimination plaintiffs win only 
about thirty-seven percent of cases that go to trial before a judge, compared to 
a win rate of fifty-nine percent for plaintiffs in tort and contract cases before a 
judge). See generally Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination 
Cases So Hard To Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001). Studies have shown that 
employment discrimination cases also tend to settle less frequently than other 
civil cases. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What Is the Set-
tlement Rate and Why Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 140 
(2009) (“The pattern strongly supports the notion that employment cases settle 
less frequently than contract or tort cases”). Studies have further shown that 
settlement amounts are often quite low. See Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Uncer-
tain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the Contem-
porary United States, AM. B. FOUND. RES. PAPER SERIES 08-04 (2008), availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093313. 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). 
 66. Many scholars have argued forcefully that a focus on intentional dis-
crimination is inadequate to address the complicated and subtle forms of dis-
advantage that minority and female employees face today. See generally Linda 
Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach 
to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 
(1995) (emphasizing that bias often is unconscious and unintentional). Doctri-
nally, moreover, Title VII has been extended to employment practices that 
have a discriminatory effect on minority applicants and employees. See 42 
U.S.C. 2000e-2(k). This Article does not suggest that hard-core intentional dis-
crimination is the only—or even the most harmful—contemporary form of em-
ployment discrimination. However, few would argue that intentional discrimi-
nation has been eradicated completely by the prevalent approach to Title VII 
enforcement. Cf. Krieger, supra, at 1163 (noting that “well over 90 percent” of 
Title VII cases are disparate-treatment cases). Thus, it is worth considering 
how the strategic model could enhance enforcement of the core prohibition on 
intentional discrimination. 
 67. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 
(1977) (“‘Disparate treatment’ . . . is the most easily understood type of dis-
crimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than oth-
ers because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of discri-
minatory motive is critical . . . .”); PAUL N. COX, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
7-4 (3d ed. 2005) (“[D]isparate treatment is ‘intentional discrimination’ or, 
more accurately, distinction in treatment motivated by race (or other prohi-
bited ground).”). 
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obtain. Evidence regarding the employer’s decisionmaking 
process is both generated and controlled by the defendant em-
ployer. Although discovery offers plaintiffs an opportunity to 
elicit information from the defendant, smoking-gun evidence of 
discrimination is rare.68 Plaintiffs thus face an uphill battle in 
establishing illicit motivation by circumstantial evidence.69 
Employers, on the other hand, can easily offer and substantiate 
facially legitimate explanations for employment decisions.70 
Cognizant of this disparity of power and of plaintiffs’ diffi-
culty in proving discriminatory intent, courts have embraced 
statistics as an alternate source of proof in disparate-treatment 
cases.71 In theory, statistical evidence showing gross disparities 
between the percentage of minorities in a given position and 
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor 
market can create a powerful inference of discrimination.72 But 
statistical proof has its own difficulties. The statistical ap-
proach requires the parties and the court to identify the appro-
priate group for comparison, which can raise tricky questions 
about who counts as “qualified” and what constitutes the rele-
vant labor market, often demanding resort to complicated and 
contestable regression analyses.73 Once those obstacles are 
 
 68. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Proof of Discriminatory Intent Under 
Title VII: United States Postal Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 70 
CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1202 (1982) (“Overt and blatant discrimination is a rela-
tively rare phenomenon.”). 
 69. See, e.g., id. at 1203 (“Evidence of illicit intent may be extremely diffi-
cult to obtain, whether the responsible individuals are conscious of their bias, 
and therefore likely to try to hide it, or whether they are expressing uncon-
scious bias through some discretionary decisionmaking process.”); Selmi, su-
pra note 64, at 563 (“[I]t seems that the general consensus today is that the 
role discrimination plays in contemporary America has been sharply dimi-
nished, and those who take this view are reluctant to find discrimination . . . 
based on circumstantial evidence.”). 
 70. See Richard A. Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 
U. PA. L. REV. 513, 518 (1987) (“[E]ven a bigoted employer is unlikely to take 
out his racial animus against a perfect worker. Most workers are not perfect. 
As to them, it is usually easy to supply a plausible reason why they were not 
hired or why they were let go.”). 
 71. See Paul Meier et al., What Happened in Hazelwood: Statistics, Em-
ployment Discrimination, and the 80% Rule, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 139, 
139 (“Tests of statistical significance have increasingly been used in employ-
ment discrimination cases since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood.”). 
 72. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308 (1977). 
 73. See Thomas J. Campbell, Regression Analysis in Title VII Cases: Min-
imum Standards, Comparable Worth, and Other Issues Where Law and Statis-
tics Meet, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1299–1300 (1984) (discussing problems with 
identifying qualified workers); Meier et al., supra note 71, at 146 (“[T]he choice 
of the relevant labor market to be used as a standard of comparison can be a 
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cleared, an additional question arises concerning legal and sta-
tistical significance. Suppose plaintiffs can show that the per-
centage of minorities employed by the defendant is lower than 
the percentage of qualified minorities in the relevant labor 
market. How big must the difference be in order to raise an in-
ference of discrimination? Most courts have adopted familiar 
tests of statistical significance to answer that question,74 but 
commentators have argued persuasively that there are critical 
differences between statistical significance and the real-world, 
practical significance.75  
Commentators likewise have challenged the core doctrinal 
assumption that “nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in 
time result in a work force more or less representative of the 
racial and ethnic composition of the population in the commu-
nity from which employees are hired.”76 Because “[a]ctual hir-
ing practices . . . rarely approximate a random process,”77 a 
comparison between real hiring and an idealized random hiring 
process will not necessarily expose discrimination. Finally, sta-
tistical proof is merely the first step for plaintiffs seeking to 
prove intentional discrimination. Ultimately, each plaintiff 
must prove that he was a victim of the employer’s presumptive-
ly discriminatory practice, which means that he must rebut any 
evidence the defendant presents to show that he would not 
have been hired regardless of race.78 As already explained, it is 
 
complex question not necessarily admitting of a simple, unique, or unambig-
uous answer.”); see also Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic 
Value of Mathematical Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 111–14 
(2007) (showing that statistical “reference classes” are malleable and can be 
gerrymandered in numerous ways).  
 74. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 311 n.17 (“[A] fluctuation of more than two or 
three standard deviations would undercut the hypothesis that decisions were 
being made randomly with respect to race.” (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 
U.S. 482, 497 (1977))). 
 75. See, e.g., Allan G. King, “Gross Statistical Disparities” as Evidence of a 
Pattern and Practice of Discrimination: Statistical Versus Legal Significance, 
22 LAB. LAW. 271, 272 (2007) (“[I]f applied mechanistically, ‘statistical signi-
ficance’ can mislead by indicating disparities at Employer A are ‘grosser’ than 
those at Employer B, when in fact the opposite is true, merely because Em-
ployer A is much larger.”). 
 76. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977). 
 77. Arthur B. Smith, Jr. & Thomas G. Abram, Quantitative Analysis and 
Proof of Employment Discrimination, 1981 U. ILL. L. REV. 33, 42. 
 78. Class action or “systemic” discrimination cases are typically bifurcated 
into liability and remedy stages of trial. Statistical proof can establish liabili-
ty, creating a presumption that all of the plaintiffs in the class were the vic-
tims of discrimination. At the remedy stage, the defendant can rebut this pre-
sumption with proof that the same decision would have been made as to any 
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exceptionally difficult for plaintiffs to prove why an employer 
made a particular decision.79  
The comprehensive model of enforcement does not work 
well in circumstances like these, where would-be enforcers face 
significant difficulties in amassing the evidence they need to 
prove violations of the law. One solution would be to devote 
more resources to law enforcement, for example by buttressing 
private enforcement with a more muscular version of public en-
forcement than the one that currently exists.80 If cost were no 
object, comprehensive enforcement could be improved signifi-
cantly. But in the real world of limited resources, the current 
approach to enforcement will continue to produce a high ratio 
of false negatives.  
Alternatively, lawmakers could turn to the randomized 
model in an effort to correct for the shortfall in enforcement, 
and adopt a rule that any employer found liable of a violation 
must pay the successful plaintiff ’s treble damages. By increas-
ing the penalty for proven violations, the randomized model 
might result in more voluntary compliance. It would do so, 
however, at a high cost to distributive fairness, as many victims 
would continue to go uncompensated while others would re-
ceive a windfall. Such distributive distortions are a problem 
with any use of the randomized model, but the concern seems 
especially pressing in this context. Because compensatory dam-
ages under Title VII are tied to wages, discrimination against 
upper-echelon, white-collar workers is far more costly than dis-
crimination against low-paid, unskilled workers.81 Accordingly, 
a damage multiplier would be unlikely to deter discrimination 
across the board. Although it might decrease more costly forms 
of discrimination, it would do relatively little to protect low-
paid workers whose claims for lost wages or back pay, even if 
tripled, have only a marginal effect on the bottom line. 
 
given plaintiff notwithstanding the discriminatory practice. In individual dis-
parate treatment cases, most courts hold that statistical proof alone cannot 
establish liability if the employer advances an individual, nondiscriminatory 
reason for its conduct. See King, supra note 75, at 272. 
 79. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Lemos, supra note 61, at 383–86 (describing recurrent proposals to 
give the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission authority to enforce 
Title VII directly through cease-and-desist orders). 
 81. See generally Philip L. Bartlett II, Disparate Treatment: How Income 
Can Affect the Level of Employer Compliance with Employment Statutes, 5 
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 419, 420–21 (2002) (arguing that employers im-
plement discrimination-prevention measures based on the expected cost of vi-
olation, as calculated by employee income). 
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Apart from causing injustice to individual victims of dis-
crimination, randomized enforcement would undercut the 
norm-building function of Title VII adjudication. The goal of 
such adjudication is not merely to compensate victims of dis-
crimination, but also to transmit—and ultimately entrench as a 
social norm—the egalitarian message that race, gender, and 
other protected characteristics should not negatively affect a 
person’s employment prospects and conditions.82 Attainment of 
this goal depends critically on the number of cases in which 
courts find the discriminating employer liable and its victim 
entitled to legal redress. By leaving deserving plaintiffs without 
vindication and redress, courts will slow down this important 
social process.  
The strategic model of enforcement could ameliorate the 
problems of proof associated with the comprehensive model 
while avoiding the distributive and other concerns raised by the 
randomized model. Rather than relying on employees to come 
up with evidence of discrimination by employers, a strategic 
approach could focus enforcement on results, targeting employ-
ers who are outliers in the sense that their workforces reflect 
abnormal racial imbalances. Plaintiffs seeking to prove discrim-
ination in hiring, for example, would need to prove only that 
the percentage of minorities in the defendant’s workforce is 
lower than the percentage of minorities employed by similarly 
situated employers. Policymakers could, of course, adopt differ-
ent criteria for identifying the “worst” abnormalities and the 
“worst” offenders.83 The critical point is that the egregiousness 
of any employer’s behavior would be gauged by comparison to 
similar employers’ behavior. 
To see how strategic enforcement would work, imagine a 
somewhat stylized model of hiring, under which each employer 
faces a choice among three options: (1) hire the most qualified 
applicants regardless of race; (2) favor white applicants, so that 
less-qualified white applicants are chosen over more-qualified 
minority applicants; or (3) favor minority applicants. The 
second option—discrimination against minorities—will be pre-
carious under a strategic enforcement model. Unless all em-
 
 82. See Sunstein, supra note 34, at 2043 (emphasizing the expressive val-
ue of law in promoting racial and gender equality by “shift[ing] social norms 
and social meaning”). 
 83. The discussion that follows identifies the “worst” offenders in hiring 
discrimination by reference to the proportion of minorities employed in a given 
position. As noted in the text, however, policymakers could employ the strate-
gic model of enforcement while adopting a different measure of egregiousness. 
  
36 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:9 
 
ployers discriminate in the same way, any employer who hires 
disproportionately few minority employees risks standing out 
as an outlier. The third option—preferential treatment of mi-
norities—will be unnecessary for the same reason. Absent 
cause to believe that other employers are engaging in a vigor-
ous form of affirmative action, an employer will not need to fa-
vor minorities in order to avoid penalties. The most 
straightforward option for each employer, then, is simply to 
hire qualified applicants without regard to race.  
This is not to say that the strategic model will weed out all 
discrimination; employers may still favor white applicants if 
they believe the benefits of that practice outweigh the costs. 
But a strategic approach to enforcement changes the cost-
benefit analysis in several ways. Under existing law, penalties 
tend to take the form of lightning strikes. Title VII suits are 
always a possibility, but rarely a success.84 The difficulties in 
proof that allow many employers to avoid sanction depress the 
expected costs of discrimination. Under the strategic model, by 
contrast, establishing liability is relatively cheap and easy for 
plaintiffs. The ease of enforcement raises the expected costs of 
discrimination even if the penalty for each violation remains 
the same. The strategic model also focuses enforcement efforts 
on a relatively small set of employers—those who exhibit ab-
normal racial imbalances in the workforce and consequently 
stand out as rampant violators. Each employer will know that 
it faces a high risk of sanction if it becomes an outlier, but will 
not know in advance which actions will prove to be conspicuous 
from a comparative perspective. In such circumstances, the 
employer can safely discriminate only if it is confident that all 
or most of its competitors are also discriminating at equivalent 
levels. Such confidence would seem ill-founded in the absence 
of collusion,85 since other employers will have to balance the 
gains from discrimination against the expected costs, and will 
fear enforcement unless they are confident that their competi-
 
 84. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 85. It should be clear that the model will work only when employers can-
not effectively collude with one another. Each employer might be able to iden-
tify the percentage of minorities employed by its competitors, but this figure 
will constantly be in flux. Absent collusion, an employer cannot be sure that its 
competitors will not hire more minorities, thereby making it an outlier. Theo-
retically, any given employer could constantly keep an eye on the racial bal-
ance in its competitors’ workforces and adjust accordingly—and as a result, it 
may be able to get away with turning away some qualified minority applicants 
if every other employer is also sailing relatively close to the wind—but such a 
strategy seems too burdensome to hold much appeal for the average employer. 
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tors are discriminating as well. Thus, the cost-benefit analysis 
that each employer will undertake needs to track the analyses 
made by its competitors, as the likelihood of sanction depends 
directly on the choices made by other employers. The enligh-
tened (or strategic) choices by some employers effectively raise 
the bar for all, setting off a cascaded retreat from high-end vi-
olations.  
The proposed approach eases enforcement efforts by ex-
changing an inquiry into an employer’s subjective intent for a 
focus on both observable and verifiable factors such as the 
number or percentage of minorities employed in a given posi-
tion. In itself, that shift in emphasis is not unique: as explained 
above, existing law has embraced statistical evidence as a way 
for plaintiffs to establish liability without the need for evidence 
of the defendant’s state of mind.86 An even simpler—albeit 
highly controversial87—way to link liability to easily accessible 
evidence would be to adopt a quota system. The remainder of 
this section examines how the strategic model differs from 
these two alternatives. Although all three approaches emphas-
ize the outcomes of employment decisions rather than the em-
ployers’ motivations, they are different in important respects. 
Attention to those differences helps highlight the possible ad-
vantages, as well as the limitations, of the strategic model.  
Consider, first, a simple quota approach, such as “a re-
quirement that every firm employ minorities in proportion to 
their percentage in the national population.”88 Such a rule may 
be grossly inaccurate as a proxy for nondiscriminatory hiring. If 
a minority group accounts for fifteen percent of the national 
population but only five percent of the qualified applicant 
pool—perhaps because historical trends have deprived its 
members of the necessary qualifications—a quota will go 
beyond preventing current discrimination, and will force em-
ployers to hire under-qualified minority applicants.89 On the 
other hand, if more than fifteen percent of qualified applicants 
 
 86. See Meier et al., supra note 71, at 139–42. 
 87. See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Twelve Topics to Consider Before 
Opting for Racial Quotas, 79 GEO. L.J. 1737, 1748–56 (1991) (arguing that al-
ternative programs for prioritizing minority employees are preferable to racial 
quotas). 
 88. David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in 
Employment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1655 
(1991) (arguing that the current approach to disparate treatment is costly and 
error prone, and proposing instead a quota enforced by a fine). 
 89. See Gottesman, supra note 87, at 1737–39. 
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are minorities, a quota tied to national population percentages 
would permit employers to reject qualified applicants solely be-
cause of their race.  
The strategic model ducks the difficult line-drawing prob-
lems that bedevil any quota system by relying on the employ-
ers’ tournament to draw the line. Employers are better situated 
than judges or legislators to gauge the relative qualifications of 
any given applicant for any given job. Perhaps the result will be 
fifteen percent minorities; perhaps it will be five percent; per-
haps it will be seventy-five percent. The “right” result will de-
pend on the characteristics of the relevant job. By linking sanc-
tions to a comparison between the revealed hiring preferences 
of similarly situated employers, strategic enforcement can util-
ize the employers’ superior knowledge and experience. More 
precisely, application of the strategic model will force out in-
formation as to which workforce is a racially imbalanced outlier 
relative to comparable workforces that constitute the employ-
ers’ norm. 
Consider, now, how the strategic model differs from the 
current system’s reliance on statistical evidence. The prevalent 
approach to statistical evidence assumes that, in the absence of 
discrimination, the outcome of employment decisions will re-
semble the outcome of a random sampling of employees from a 
qualified pool of applicants.90 Just as a bright-line quota may 
fail to reflect the realities of the labor market, the mathemati-
cal ideal of random hiring oftentimes proves to be unrealistic in 
practice. In such situations, the statistical approach can gener-
ate false positives and false negatives. Here, too, a comparison 
between similarly situated employers may increase both accu-
racy and ease of enforcement. For example, one way in which 
actual hiring practices deviate from the imagined ideal of ran-
dom selection is that employers often hire employees in non-
random groups, such as when “a person recruited . . . recom-
mend[s] or otherwise bring[s] along friends into the company,” 
or when “success with applicants from a given school or other 
organization . . . set[s] up a short-term ‘pipeline’ of future appli-
cants.”91 Neither scenario necessarily reflects discrimination, 
 
 90. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307 (1977); 
Meier et al., supra note 71, at 142 (discussing the “powerful assumption of 
random sampling” that animates post-Hazelwood case law). 
 91. Meier et al., supra note 71, at 154. 
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but the results may look like discrimination if clustering effects 
are not properly taken into account.92  
If clustered hiring is indeed the norm rather than the ex-
ception—as commentators have argued93—the strategic model 
should avoid this problem, because the defendant-employer and 
its competitors in the labor market will follow similar hiring 
patterns. More broadly, unless an employer’s hiring practices 
are especially idiosyncratic, the comparative approach of the 
strategic model might help ameliorate the problems that ac-
company comparisons between real-world hiring and random 
samplings.  
As the discussion thus far suggests, the strategic model 
will work best in areas where there is an easily identifiable 
market. A strategic approach to enforcement requires precision 
in identifying similarly situated employers—it would not be 
useful to compare the percentage of minorities employed as law 
professors in New York City to the percentage of minorities 
employed as middle school teachers in New York City or the 
percentage of minorities employed as law professors in Mil-
waukee. In that sense, the model might replicate some of the 
difficulties with statistical evidence under the existing system, 
which requires plaintiffs to identify the relevant labor market. 
Yet the strategic model’s real-world orientation allows it to 
sidestep some of the thorniest problems with the current sys-
tem. For example, the strategic model largely avoids any need 
to identify the necessary qualifications for a job, since it focuses 
on a comparison of actual employees, and employers are pre-
sumed to hire only qualified workers. Similarly, while current 
law must take pains to avoid comparisons to workforces that 
are skewed by affirmative action programs,94 no such correction 
is required under the strategic model. Only if virtually every 
employer engaged in affirmative action would an employer’s 
failure to exercise race-based preferences result in outlier sta-
tus. And in the event that the overwhelming majority of em-
ployers decided without legal compulsion that business would 
be improved by hiring significantly more minorities, it would 
then seem appropriate to view with suspicion any employers 
who did not follow suit.  
 
 92. See id. at 155. 
 93. See id. at 154. 
 94. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 311–12 (emphasizing the importance of 
“appropriate comparative figures”). 
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An important caveat is in order. The goal here is not to of-
fer a “fix” for the current state of antidiscrimination law, and 
this Article addresses only a small slice of that immense topic. 
However, strategic enforcement need not be an all-or-nothing 
affair. The strategic model could be used as a cost-saving sup-
plement to—rather than a replacement of—the traditional 
comprehensive approach to enforcing the ban on intentional 
discrimination.95 Moreover, strategic enforcement of straight-
forward disparate treatment claims could coexist with special 
enforcement strategies for combating various subtle forms of 
discrimination not discussed here. For example, the strategic 
model is hardly suitable as a tool for eradicating structural 
barriers to employment advancement, such as those associated 
with childcare responsibilities. Although discrimination against 
employees with children is wrong, it is entirely rational from an 
employer’s perspective. Hence, there is a heightened risk that 
all or most employers will decide independently to engage in 
such discrimination, which will impede the cascaded retreat 
that lies at the core of the strategic model.96 
Although the strategic model is not a panacea, its compar-
ative focus offers some noteworthy advantages over conven-
tional approaches to liability. In contrast to the comprehensive 
approach that requires parties and courts to undertake a com-
plicated and costly inquiry into discriminatory intent, the stra-
 
 95. The possibility of a mixed approach should help ameliorate concerns 
that the simple strategic model would yield too many false negatives or false 
positives. For those who believe that the strategic approach would result in 
insufficient enforcement, the model could be supplemented by other approach-
es to enforcement, whether public or private. Those who believe that the stra-
tegic model would produce overenforcement may still benefit from our new in-
sight by treating the “outlier” status as a necessary, albeit not sufficient, 
condition for liability. Under this approach, the plaintiff would bear the bur-
den of proving that the defendant-employer’s workforce contains fewer minori-
ties than comparable workforces. The burden would then shift to the defen-
dant to establish that it would have made the same employment decision 
regardless of race. The result would parallel the current judicial treatment of 
mixed-motive cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); Desert Palace, Inc. v. 
Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). 
 96. The risk of “rational” discrimination exists in our hiring example as 
well, as employers might rely on racial stereotypes in an effort to reduce 
search costs. But the likelihood that multiple employers will settle indepen-
dently on the same course of action, with the same results, seems significantly 
lower in the hiring context. It is easy to imagine multiple employers indepen-
dently choosing to reward employees who work long hours, without regard to 
childcare responsibilities. It is far more difficult to imagine multiple employers 
independently adopting precisely the same approach to hiring, resulting in 
equal numbers of minority employees in comparable positions. 
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tegic model links liability to observable, verifiable, and easy-to-
prove facts about an employer’s workforce. Strategic enforce-
ment would require plaintiffs to amass information about mul-
tiple employers, rather than just one—an extra burden that 
might involve a significant cost. On the other hand, the strate-
gic approach would also create a strong incentive for potential 
plaintiffs, legal advocacy groups, and civil rights watchdogs to 
pool information about discriminatory employment practices. 
This network economy may ultimately improve the enforce-
ment of antidiscrimination laws. As explained in the previous 
Part, the strategic model works best in areas where it is more 
difficult for law enforcers to identify “bad” than “worst.”97 
Whether that is true in the employment-discrimination context 
is an empirical question on which—to date—there is no evi-
dence. Given the stark shortcomings of the current approach to 
Title VII enforcement, the strategic model merits consideration 
as a new policy tool.  
Like the randomized model, success of the strategic ap-
proach does not depend on increasing the rate of enforcement 
or the resources devoted to uncovering unlawful activity. But, 
while randomized enforcement is just that—random—the stra-
tegic approach concentrates enforcement on the worst offend-
ers, encouraging firms to downscale any discrimination in order 
to avoid outlier status. By focusing the inquiry on the results of 
actual employment practices in the relevant industry, the stra-
tegic approach takes advantage of employers’ superior access to 
information about the circumstances and needs of their busi-
ness. It relies primarily on employers, rather than lawmakers, 
to determine optimal employment practices. The model does 
not ignore the risk that employers may have a “taste for dis-
crimination.”98 However, rather than expecting employees to 
uncover those discriminatory tastes, the strategic model sets up 
competition among employers to encourage compliance and 
trigger enforcement.  
B. STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS AND THE ONE PERSON, ONE 
VOTE PRINCIPLE 
A second candidate for strategic enforcement is the consti-
tutional guarantee of equality in voting. In a series of cases de-
cided in the 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized a right—
 
 97. See supra Part II. 
 98. GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971). 
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grounded in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment—to have one’s vote counted equally with every 
other voter’s.99 The principle of one person, one vote that 
emerged requires that state and local voting districts contain 
roughly equal total populations.100 The rule has been flexible 
from the start.101 Acknowledging that “it is a practical impossi-
bility to arrange legislative districts so that each one has an 
identical number of residents, or citizens, or voters,”102 the 
Court has held that deviations from population equality might 
be justified by “legitimate objectives” such as creating compact 
districts of contiguous territory, respecting existing political 
boundaries, preserving existing districts, and avoiding contests 
between incumbents.103 
Although the Court has disclaimed resort to “rigid mathe-
matical standards,”104 over time one person, one vote cases 
have coalesced around a particular figure: ten percent.105 Total 
population deviations of less than ten percent are deemed “mi-
nor” and are insufficient to create a prima facie case of discrim-
 
 99. Avery v. Midland Cnty., 390 U.S. 474, 478–79 (1968) (applying the one 
person, one vote requirement to all of a state’s political subdivisions); Reynolds 
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires 
that a State make an honest and good faith effort to construct districts, in both 
houses of its legislature, as nearly of equal population as is practicable.”). 
 100. Compliance with the one person, one vote requirement typically is 
gauged by the deviation in total population between the most populous and 
least populous districts, but states are free to base districting decisions on the 
number of actual or potential voters instead. See Grant M. Hayden, The Su-
preme Court and Voting Rights: A More Complete Exit Strategy, 83 N.C. L. 
REV. 949, 964–65 (2005). 
 101. The Court has derived a similar one person, one vote requirement for 
voting districts for the U.S. House of Representatives from Article I, section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution. That provision states that members of the House of 
Representatives shall be chosen “by the People of the Several States.” U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 2. However, because of the differences between Article I and 
the Equal Protection Clause, congressional districts are held to a stricter 
standard, under which the state bears the burden of justifying any deviation 
from equal population, “no matter how small.” Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 
725, 730, 734 (1983). The discussion here will focus on state and local election 
districts, which are governed by the more flexible rule of equal protection. 
 102. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 577. 
 103. See, e.g., Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983) (discussing 
permissible districting objectives); Karcher, 462 U.S. at 740 (same). 
 104. Roman v. Sincock, 377 U.S. 695, 710 (1964). 
 105. Brown, 462 U.S. at 842 (“Our decisions have established, as a general 
matter, that an apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation 
under 10% falls within th[e] category of minor deviations.”). 
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ination.106 Deviations of more than ten percent are constitu-
tionally suspect. As such, they lead to invalidation of the dis-
tricting plan unless the state can show “a rational and legiti-
mate state policy for the districting plan.”107 
Courts and commentators disagree over whether the ten 
percent rule is properly understood as a safe harbor—rendering 
deviations of less than ten percent immune from constitutional 
challenge on one person, one vote grounds—or whether the 
benchmark serves merely to allocate the burden of proof.108 
Under the latter view, the state must justify deviations greater 
than ten percent by reference to neutral criteria, while the 
plaintiff bears the burden of proof with respect to deviations of 
less than ten percent.109 In practice, however, the ten percent 
rule tends to operate as a safe harbor, even in jurisdictions that 
condemn “minor” deviations that are the result of an arbitrary 
or unfair districting process.110 The difficulty is primarily one of 
proof. Under the burden-shifting conception of the ten percent 
rule, plaintiffs challenging deviations of less than ten percent 
must persuade the court that the redistricting body did not 
“make an honest and good faith effort” to construct equipopu-
lous districts.111 Several factors combine to make that burden 
virtually impossible for plaintiffs to sustain in the usual case.  
First, there is deep theoretical disagreement about what 
count as permissible and impermissible motives in the context 
of redistricting—particularly when it comes to politics. While 
 
 106. Id.; see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 745 (1973) (“[M]inor 
deviations from mathematical equality among state legislative districts are 
insufficient to make out a prima facie case of invidious discrimination under 
the Fourteenth Amendment so as to require justification by the State.”). 
 107. Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212, 1218 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 108. For arguments that the ten percent rule is a safe harbor, see, for ex-
ample, Fund for Accurate and Informed Representation, Inc. v. Weprin, 796 F. 
Supp. 662, 668 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (per curiam), aff’d, 506 U.S. 1017 (1992); Gor-
in v. Karpan, 788 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (D. Wyo. 1992); Michael A. Carvin & 
Louis K. Fisher, “A Legislative Task”: Why Four Types of Redistricting Chal-
lenges Are Not, or Should Not Be, Recognized by Courts, 4 ELECTION L.J. 2, 29 
(2005). For arguments that the ten percent rule is instead a burden-shifter, 
see, for example, Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220; Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 
1340 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per curiam) (three-judge panel), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 
(2004); Hulme v. Madison Cnty., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1047 (S.D. Ill. 2001); 
and Adam Raviv, Unsafe Harbors: One Person, One Vote and Partisan Redis-
tricting, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1001, 1013 (2005). 
 109. See Daly, 93 F.3d at 1220. 
 110. See infra note 123 and accompanying text (describing how rarely chal-
lenges to deviations of less than ten percent succeed). 
 111. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577 (1964). 
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politics properly (and inevitably) will play some role in the dis-
tricting process,112 there is a point at which partisan and other 
political motivations threaten to render the process fundamen-
tally unfair.113 The problem, of course, is where to draw the 
line. In its 2004 decision in Vieth v. Jubelirer, a plurality of the 
Court held that complaints of partisan manipulation are non-
justiciable, at least when packaged as political gerrymandering 
claims.114 Nevertheless, during the same term an eight-Justice 
majority summarily affirmed the judgment in Cox v. Lar-
ios115—a case in which the lower court had struck down a state 
redistricting plan under the rubric of one person, one vote be-
cause it “reflected ‘blatantly partisan and discriminatory’ at-
tempts to protect Democratic incumbents while undermining 
Republican-held seats.”116 Thus, although the Court considers 
itself incapable of drawing a judicially manageable line be-
tween permissible and impermissible partisanship in the ger-
rymandering context,117 it continues to condone an inquiry into 
political motivation in one person, one vote claims. But just 
how much politics is “too much” remains unclear. 
Second, even if courts could agree on stable sets of legiti-
mate and illegitimate criteria in districting—and even if parti-
san advantage were excluded from the category of permissible 
districting considerations—plaintiffs would find it difficult to 
prove the illicit motivation of a redistricting body. In some re-
spects, the difficulty is similar to that discussed in the previous 
section, regarding proof of discriminatory intent in employment 
discrimination cases. Put simply, few defendants are foolish 
enough to create an obvious record of illegal conduct.118 But the 
problem of proof runs deeper in the districting context because 
of the nature of the defendant. In most states, district lines are 
 
 112. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“Politics and po-
litical considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”). 
 113. Richard L. Hasen, Bad Legislative Intent, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 843, 845 
(emphasizing the “degree problem”). 
 114. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion).  
 115. 542 U.S. 947 (2004). 
 116. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Where to Draw the Line?: 
Judicial Review of Political Gerrymanders, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 541, 542 (2004) 
(quoting Larios v. Cox, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1347 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (per cu-
riam) (three-judge panel), aff’d, 542 U.S. 947 (2004)). 
 117. See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 277–78 (citing the lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving political gerrymandering claims). 
 118. See Hasen, supra note 113, at 861 (“Few legislators are likely to admit 
publicly that their purpose in passing an election law is to protect themselves 
from fair political competition, an admission that would not sit well with voters.”). 
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drawn by the state legislature; other states use redistricting 
commissions.119 The difficulties with divining the intent of such 
multimember bodies are well known.120 Different members may 
have had different motivations for the same act, making it im-
possible to ascribe an intent to the redistricting body as a 
whole. 
Making matters worse, virtually all districting bodies are 
entitled to a legislative privilege that shields their communica-
tions and other records from compelled disclosure.121 As others 
have noted, “[b]ecause of the legislative privilege, critical in-
formation as to motive may be difficult to obtain where so much 
of the work of the redistricting body, even the work of a non-
partisan redistricting commission, is done in closed session and 
by secretive email.”122 The upshot is that plaintiffs rarely can 
carry their burden of proof in cases that fall below the ten per-
cent threshold. Indeed, in the years since the ten percent rule 
was announced, only three such challenges have succeeded.123 
It is no coincidence that none of the elected defendants in those 
cases asserted any legislative privilege.124 
These problems of proof undermine a comprehensive ap-
proach to enforcement of the one person, one vote principle. The 
current system is ill-suited to uncovering and remedying bad-
faith districting practices when the result is a total population 
deviation of less than ten percent. States have recognized as 
much, and tend to use ten percent as the target for their redis-
 
 119. Paul F. Eckstein, Musings on Redistricting Litigation, 34 LITIG. 42, 43 
(2007). 
 120. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legis-
lative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992). 
 121. Forty-three states have constitutional provisions that provide a privi-
lege for state legislators analogous to the federal Speech or Debate Clause, 
which “protects both legislators and their staff against civil and criminal lia-
bility, as well as against compelled questioning or document production, con-
cerning all matters that are ‘an integral part of the deliberative and commu-
nicative processes’ of legislating.” Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of 
the Legislative Privilege in State Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 
225 (2003) (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972)). In 
states that lack such provisions, “the common law has frequently recognized a 
similar protection.” Id. at 224. The privilege attaches to the act of legislating, 
not the status of “legislator,” and therefore has been extended to redistricting 
commissions made up of independent consultants. See Stephanie Cirkovich, 
Note, Abandoning the Ten Percent Rule and Reclaiming One Person, One Vote, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1823, 1843 (2010). 
 122. Eckstein, supra note 119, at 47. 
 123. See Raviv, supra note 108, at 1027–37 (describing the cases).  
 124. See Cirkovich, supra note 121, at 1841. 
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tricting efforts.125 Moreover, their deviations from population 
equality predominantly occupy the upper end of the range. Ac-
cording to data from the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, the majority of state houses now have population devia-
tions of between nine and ten percent.126 
One response, of course, is to deny that deviations of less 
than ten percent can violate the Constitution. On this view, be-
cause “minor” deviations “cause no constitutional injury, they 
are valid regardless of the legislature’s reasons for creating 
them.”127 Even if that is correct, it is difficult to see why ten 
percent should be the magic number. The Supreme Court has 
never explained the logic behind the ten percent figure.128 Its 
best defense appears to be administrability. If explicitly 
adopted as a safe harbor, the ten percent rule would allow 
courts to enforce a bright line, saving them the difficulty of de-
termining whether any given deviation is “minor” in the sense 
that it does not impair any individual’s right to vote by diluting 
its weight “in a substantial fashion . . . when compared with 
votes of [other] citizens.”129 The same could be said for any oth-
er bright-line rule, however. Absent a coherent argument for 
why ten percent is a better proxy for “harmless” deviations 
than, say, five or fifteen percent, strict adherence to a ten per-
cent cutoff seems arbitrary indeed. 
A different response to the problems with the ten percent 
rule might be to abandon it entirely, requiring the state to jus-
tify any deviations from population equality, no matter how 
small.130 That move would reflect a truly comprehensive ap-
proach to enforcement, undistorted by the influence of the ten 
 
 125. See Carvin & Fisher, supra note 108, at 28 (“Following the 2000 cen-
sus, state legislatures around the country relied heavily on the 10% rule.”); cf. 
Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (per curiam) 
(“[A]n express objective of staying within a ten-percent deviation while pur-
suing other legitimate goals provides no support to the plaintiffs’ claim of in-
vidious or arbitrary discrimination or of bad faith.”).  
 126. See Raviv, supra note 108, at 1038. 
 127. Carvin & Fisher, supra note 108, at 29. 
 128. See Raviv, supra note 108, at 1012 (“The Court arrived at the ten per-
cent benchmark without explicitly explaining why this was a logical number to 
use in determining minor deviations in state and local districting plans.”). 
 129. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); see also Carvin & Fisher, 
supra note 108, at 30 (“A bright-line standard is essential in this area, since 
lower courts and legislatures otherwise would be at a complete loss to deter-
mine when population deviations are ‘minor.’”). 
 130. This is essentially the approach the Court has taken for districts for 
the U.S. House of Representatives. See supra note 101. 
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percent benchmark. Yet it would come with a big price tag. 
First, given widely acknowledged inaccuracies in the census da-
ta, coupled with differences between the total population re-
vealed in the census and the voting population, there is no 
guarantee that perfectly equipopulous districts in fact contain 
equal numbers of voters.131 Factor in changes in population 
throughout each decade, and a “zero-tolerance” approach to 
population disparities looks just as arbitrary as a ten percent 
safe harbor.132 Second, jettisoning the ten percent rule would 
significantly complicate enforcement of the one person, one vote 
principle, as it would force courts to confront head-on the diffi-
cult line-drawing problems discussed above. Simply placing the 
burden of justification on the state would not clarify the point 
at which politics “goes too far.”133 Courts would have to “devel-
op some idea of where the line between constitutionally legiti-
mate and constitutionally illegitimate partisanship falls. In 
short, they must do exactly what four of the Justices who re-
jected the plaintiffs’ claims in Vieth . . . thought could not be 
done.”134  
The randomized model offers no escape from this morass. A 
randomized approach to enforcement simply would not work in 
the redistricting context, because the available remedy takes 
the form of an injunction (a court-imposed district plan or an 
order to the redistricting body to try again),135 rather than 
damages. This limitation on the randomized model extends 
well beyond one person, one vote cases. It also applies to the 
 
 131. See Hayden, supra note 100, at 965–66 (arguing that census data are 
“plagued by systemic errors” and that “these slippages swamp the precise tol-
erances built into the one person, one vote rules, and make such exacting 
judgments about district size absurd”); Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 116, 
at 569 (“Although there is apparent precision to . . . strict application of the 
equipopulation principle[,] . . . the mathematical exactitude is compromised by 
the general imprecision of the underlying census enumeration, and the inclu-
sion of children, aliens, and other disenfranchised individuals (such as ex-
offenders)—whose numbers can vary dramatically from district to district.”). 
 132. See Eckstein, supra note 119, at 44 (“Relying on total population fig-
ures instead of voting age figures can create a significantly different result; 
using decennial data in fast-growing districts even one year after the census is 
taken (let alone at mid-decade, as was done recently in Texas and attempted 
in Colorado) can distort the result even further.”).  
 133. Cox v. Larios, 542 U.S. 947, 952 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
that all but one of the Justices agree that “politics as usual” is a “traditional 
[redistricting] criterion, and a constitutional one, so long as it does not go too far”). 
 134. Issacharoff & Karlan, supra note 116, at 568. 
 135. See Eckstein, supra note 119, at 48 (discussing the two injunction op-
tions courts have when redistricting). 
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many areas of federal law where doctrines such as sovereign136 
and legislative immunity137 bar the recovery of damages, leav-
ing prospective injunctive relief as the only available “penalty.” 
In such circumstances, the engine of randomized enforcement—
the penalty multiplier calibrated to compensate for the short-
fall in law enforcement—will be unavailable. 
Consider, instead, a strategic approach to enforcement of 
the one person, one vote principle. The strategic model would 
focus enforcement on outliers, which in this context would like-
ly mean districts with the largest total population dispari-
ties.138 As noted, the primary advantage of aggressive applica-
tion of the ten percent rule is ease of administration.139 
Focusing on mathematical figures prevents judges from thrash-
ing too far into the “political thicket,”140 and offers judicially 
manageable standards for distinguishing between permissible 
and impermissible deviations from population equality. The 
strategic approach achieves the same ends while avoiding the 
arbitrariness associated with both the ten percent and the zero-
tolerance approaches. Although targeting outliers would re-
quire courts to compare the population disparities in up to fifty 
states’ districting plans rather than comparing one plan to ten 
or zero percent, the task requires no more than the “sixth-grade 
arithmetic” demanded by existing law.141 Moreover, rather than 
setting an arbitrary standard ex ante, the strategic model relies 
on competition among states to distinguish between good faith 
efforts to create equipopulous districts and districting processes 
tainted by arbitrariness and discrimination.  
Admittedly, strategic enforcement would mean that states 
would enter the districting process without a clear benchmark; 
states could no longer be confident that deviations of less than 
ten percent would almost certainly be sustained. But it is not at 
 
 136. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756–57 (1999) (distinguishing be-
tween suits seeking monetary awards from state officials sued in their official 
capacity, which are barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and suits seeking 
prospective injunctive relief, which are permitted). 
 137. See supra note 121 (explaining that legislative immunity at the state 
and federal level precludes civil or criminal liability for the performance of leg-
islative functions).  
 138. A strategic approach could focus instead on average deviations from 
equipopulousness. The distinction is immaterial for present purposes, and we 
take no position on which measure is preferable. 
 139. See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 140. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 141. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713, 750 
(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
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all clear that such ex ante clarity is a blessing, as the apparent 
consequence is that states make virtually no effort to do better 
than ten percent—or wherever the benchmark is set.142 A stra-
tegic approach would make enforcement easy to do once district 
lines are drawn, but difficult to predict as the process unfolds. 
The resulting uncertainty should force states to hedge their 
bets, foregoing manipulations that might expose them as out-
liers. The result may be that most states adopt plans with low-
er deviations from equal population than the nine to ten per-
cent deviations that currently are the norm.  
It is important to acknowledge, however, that a strategic 
enforcement model might encourage states to deviate even 
more than they currently do from equipopulous districts. 
Whether such an outcome should be cause for concern is a diffi-
cult question. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that collusion 
among states is impossible and that no state can observe the 
outcome of another state’s districting process before completing 
its own. In those circumstances, any state that adopts a plan 
with a total population deviation of fifteen percent, for example, 
must believe that many other states will do the same. Such a 
belief might be justified if larger deviations make it possible for 
states to achieve valid and important districting goals, such as 
respecting county lines or creating majority-minority dis-
tricts.143 If that were true, it would suggest that the current 
approach to enforcement is deterring states from pursuing val-
id policies and would count in favor of a more flexible, strategic 
approach. But a state also might adopt a plan with large devia-
tions in order to serve more pernicious ends,144 knowing that 
other states have the same strong incentive to use the district-
ing process for partisan advantage. The temptation will always 
 
 142. The Supreme Court has recognized as much in the context of congres-
sional districts, citing this tendency as an argument against making excep-
tions for “minor” deviations from the strict requirement of equipopulation. See 
Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 731 (1983) (“Adopting any standard other 
than population equality, using the best census data available, would subtly 
erode the Constitution’s ideal of equal representation. If state legislators knew 
that a certain de minimis level of population differences was acceptable, they 
would doubtless strive to achieve that level rather than equality.”); Kirkpat-
rick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 531 (1969) (“[T]o consider a certain range of var-
iances de minimis would encourage legislators to strive for that range rather 
than for equality as nearly as practicable.”). 
 143. See Hayden, supra note 100, at 966–69. 
 144. For example, states may draw districts with the goal of increasing the 
number of Democratic representatives and reducing the number of Republican 
representatives, or vice versa. 
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be present when district lines are drawn by legislators, “who 
are (by definition) incumbents (and almost invariably) from one 
of the two major parties.”145 The risk, then, is that states will 
abandon good faith efforts to achieve equal districts because 
they will know that similar political pressures will induce other 
states to do the same.146  
That risk is not inconsequential, but political differences 
among the states complicate the picture significantly. Each 
state’s political situation will be slightly different and will yield 
different results even if all legislators succumb to the tempta-
tion of self-interested districting. Moreover, there is no neces-
sary connection between political gerrymanders—partisan or 
bipartisan—and total population deviations; “absolute equality 
is perfectly compatible with ‘gerrymandering’ of the worst 
sort.”147 Finally, many states leave districting to independent—
and often bipartisan—commissions.148 Although independent 
commissions are not free from political pressures or motiva-
tions, their objectives may be less transparent than those of a 
legislative majority. Thus, even if one assumes that legislators 
always will try to draw district lines so as to protect their own 
seats and those of others in their party, it is quite difficult to 
predict what the resulting population deviations will be.  
The preceding discussion assumed that collusion among 
states is impossible and the results of districting are unknown. 
In cases where those assumptions do not hold, the risk of 
gamesmanship increases and the utility of the strategic model 
decreases accordingly. For example, because redistricting 
usually happens just once a decade and the number of state 
legislative districts is finite, a state may delay its districting 
process in the hope of observing the results in other states and 
then adopting a plan with population disparities just below the 
highest state or cluster of states. One difficulty with that ap-
 
 145. Hasen, supra note 113, at 848 (discussing the ever-present “potential 
for self-interested election law legislation”). 
 146. The potential for gamesmanship is heightened by the fact that the 
penalty for guessing wrong will usually be another round of districting—a tol-
erable fate, perhaps worth hazarding in exchange for a decade’s worth of polit-
ical insulation. See Eckstein, supra note 119, at 48 (explaining that, “[w]hen 
they invalidate plans, courts are most comfortable in directing the redistrict-
ing body to redo the plan in accordance with the direction provided,” though 
courts occasionally create their own plans when time is of the essence). 
 147. Kirkpatrick, 394 U.S. at 551; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging 
Politics: The Elusive Quest for Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEX. L. 
REV. 1643, 1654 (1992) (quoting and discussing the above language). 
 148. See Eckstein, supra note 119, at 43–44. 
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proach is that litigation may change the landscape, removing 
the first set of outliers and revealing the wait-and-see state as 
the most rampant offender. Another is that there are limita-
tions on how long states can delay, since the new census will 
almost certainly render the existing district plan grossly un-
equal and therefore open to challenge.149 Nevertheless, conced-
ing the risk of some gamesmanship of this sort does not doom 
the strategic model. If the model encourages “honest and good 
faith” efforts in many or even most states, the occasional re-
sults-oriented districting of the kind imagined here may be a 
tolerable price to pay.  
A more pressing concern is collusion. Collusion between 
states is a real possibility both because there is a limited num-
ber of districting bodies and because states, unlike employers, 
are not competitors. If undetected, widespread collusion would 
defeat strategic enforcement, as it would allow states to aban-
don good faith districting efforts without risk of sanction. Yet 
courts have experience uncovering collusion in other areas, in-
cluding criminal and antitrust law,150 and should be able to do 
the same in the redistricting context. Legislative privilege may 
prevent plaintiffs from wresting proof of collusion from the de-
fendants themselves. But the districting process typically in-
volves more than one party, and disappointed minority party 
politicians will always have an incentive to expose collusion by 
the majority. In contrast to antitrust, where those with the 
strongest incentive to expose collusion are outsiders looking 
in—consumers or competitors—the “losers” in the districting 
game will often be involved in the process, albeit lacking the 
power to control its results. The exception is the bipartisan ger-
rymander, in which incumbents of both parties draw districts 
that will ensure their reelection. The “losers” in such circum-
stances—potential challengers and voters—will have played no 
part in the districting process and may face more difficulties in 
outing collusion. Nevertheless, competition among politicians 
and parties, if not states as such, should provide an effective 
check on the worst abuses. 
C. COPYRIGHT DAMAGES 
Copyright law offers a third, and final, illustration of the 
strategic enforcement’s promise. Copyright infringements are 
 
 149. See id. at 46 (explaining that redistricting bodies face challenges if 
they are not “attempting to create a redistricting plan in a timely fashion”). 
 150. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.  
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largely undetectable.151 Their invisibility makes it difficult for 
the owner to identify and prosecute the infringer—a faceless 
hacker who downloads music from a semilegal Internet plat-
form, an anonymous reproducer of videotaped films, a nameless 
gamer who breaks the codes of computer games and uses them 
for free, and a prolific, but unidentifiable, reader who photocop-
ies half of the local library and shares his literary treasures 
with friends and family. Copyright infringements also do not 
physically damage the protected work. Instead, they dilute the 
owner’s earning opportunities and reputation—a causally 
amorphous intellectual property damage that most owners find 
difficult to prove.152 The compounded effect of these difficulties 
on copyright suits is high cost and a low expected recovery.153 
 
 151. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
125 (1999) (noting that copyright infringers in communication networks are 
difficult to identify and bring to justice); see also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jo-
bela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194, 195–96 (2d Cir. 1964) (explaining that statu-
tory damages for copyright infringement allow “the owner of a copyright some 
recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law render diffi-
cult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of profits” (quoting Douglas v. 
Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935))). 
 152. There is nearly unanimous agreement among intellectual property 
scholars that the scope of copyright protection is overbroad. See, e.g., Gideon 
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1509–16 (2009) 
(arguing that copyright holders “enjoy very broad protection” at the “expense 
of future creators”). See generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: 
THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD (2001) (putting forth the 
notion that the Internet is losing its innovative nature due to copyright laws); 
NEIL W. NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 54–80 (2008) (discussing “copy-
right’s ungainly expansion”); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND 
COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HOW IT THREATENS 
CREATIVITY (2001) (arguing that copyright law depresses creativity); Jessica 
Litman, Billowing White Goo, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 587, 587 (2008) (attesting 
that rights granted by copyright law underwent extraordinary expansion over 
the past fifty years). There is, however, an equally broad consensus about the 
necessity to enforce the rights of the owners who merit this protection. See Ri-
chard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Lib-
eral Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 487–96 (2010) 
(articulating social benefits of the injunction-based protection of intellectual 
property); Parchomovsky & Stein, supra, at 1516–23 (arguing that although not 
all copyrights need to be strictly enforced, the very original copyrights should). 
 153. See, e.g., Lori A. Morea, The Future of Music in a Digital Age: The On-
going Conflict Between Copyright Law and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 195, 249 (2005) (“[I]t is simply too difficult to enforce tradi-
tional U.S. copyright law in today’s technology-driven environment.”); Lateef 
Mtima, So Dark the Con(tu) of Man: The Quest for a Software Derivative Work 
Right in Section 117, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 21 (2008) (“The digital format of 
software programs makes it difficult to enforce even the most basic of the cop-
yright holder’s exclusive rights: the rights to reproduce, distribute, and/or pre-
pare derivative versions of her work.”); Steven Wilf, The Making of the Post-
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This effect makes the comprehensive model dysfunctional. Un-
scrupulous infringers of copyrighted works are well aware of 
this vulnerability and exploit it to its fullest by increasing the 
volume of their illicit activities.  
To make copyright violations economically unattractive, 
copyright law moved away from the unworkable comprehensive 
model by adopting a statutory rule that exempts plaintiffs from 
the duty to prove their actual damages. This special rule pro-
vides that a successful plaintiff can simply elect to recover an 
award in any amount between $750 and $150,000 per infringed 
work.154 Courts could apply this provision in two different 
ways. One way is to apply the randomized model of enforce-
ment: randomly select a small number of copyright infringers 
and let them pay for the sins of all other violators. Another way 
of applying the statutory damage rule is to use the strategic 
model of enforcing the law. Under this model, courts would im-
pose high-end penalties on the worst copyright infringers and 
allow only modest recoveries against all others. This method of 
awarding statutory damages would make suits against small-
time violators unprofitable and those violators would be practi-
cally immune from prosecutions. This immunity would make it 
economically attractive for violators to seek the safe harbor 
zone by downscaling their activities. At the same time, plain-
tiffs and courts would concentrate their efforts on large-scale 
infringers of copyright. These infringers will receive high pen-
alties, and their probability of receiving those penalties will al-
so be higher than under the system that spreads its enforce-
ment effort over all violators. As a result, some—or, perhaps, 
many—of these large-scale infringers will downscale their ac-
tivities as well in order to reach the safe harbor.  
Courts generally take the former path without much dis-
cussion. Their unqualified adoption of the randomized model 
faced no dissenters. Consistent with this model’s principles, 
 
War Paradigm in American Intellectual Property Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
139, 177 (2007) (“[C]omposers and publishers . . . found it difficult to enforce 
their copyrights.”); David Haskel, Note, A Good Value Chain Gone Bad: Indi-
rect Copyright Liability in Perfect 10 v. Visa, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 405, 405 
(2008) (“Digitization and the Internet have radically complicated the chal-
lenges of copyright enforcement. In the digital age, anyone can make and dis-
tribute copies instantaneously anywhere in the world at very little cost. Na-
tional borders are less relevant online, making it more difficult to enforce 
copyright against foreign infringers.”). 
 154. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). For a nonwillful and altogether innocent in-
fringer, the statutory damage can be reduced and must always be below 
$30,000. Id. 
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courts allow private copyright owners to select the infringers 
who will pay the high penalty. The grant of this unchecked 
power paid no heed to the fundamental misalignment between 
the private incentives to use the legal system and society’s ben-
efit.155 An aggrieved copyright owner only cares about her ex-
pected recovery amount and future protection of her work. All 
that matters to her is how easy it would be for her to prevail in 
the contemplated suit, whether the defendant has enough mon-
ey to pay the statutory award, and, finally, whether the court’s 
verdict will enhance her reputation as a tough player and drive 
future infringers away from her work. There is nothing else an 
owner is interested in.156 She is completely oblivious to society’s 
copyright policy and whether her suit will help society to set up 
optimal deterrence against copyright infringers.157  
To illustrate this misalignment between private and so-
cietal interests, consider a copyright owner whose litigation 
budget allows him to sue only one infringer of his works out of 
two. The owner must choose between two infringers: an Inter-
net-based company that illegally reproduced and sold twenty 
CDs containing the owner’s copyrighted music and then disap-
peared; and Mary, a single mother with a part-time employ-
ment and a $200,000 house, who downloaded five of those al-
bums onto her MP3 player. The owner estimates that he has a 
five percent chance of locating the company and its executives. 
If he does, the court will award him the maximal amount of 
statutory compensation (20 × $150,000 = $3,000,000). The own-
er’s expected recovery thus amounts to $150,000.158 To file the 
suit, however, the owner would have to spend $50,000 on pri-
vate investigators and attorneys. His expected net recovery 
amount will therefore be $100,000. Suing Mary, on the other 
hand, will cost the owner only $5000. Because Mary is both a 
willful and serial infringer, the court will likely order her to pay 
the owner $30,000 or more for each album she downloaded.159 
 
 155. See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between 
the Private and the Social Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 
575 (1997). 
 156. See id. at 577–78. 
 157.  Id. 
 158. $3,000,000 × 5% = $150,000. 
 159. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Technically, Mary may be required to pay the 
owner $30,000 or more per each song, rather than per album. See Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Re-
medy in Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 442 (2009). 
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The owner’s expected recovery will thus be $145,000.160 Be-
cause Mary owns a $200,000 house, and the homestead exemp-
tion in her state is capped at $75,000,161 the owner can realisti-
cally expect that he also will be able to collect $125,000 or a 
close amount from Mary.162 As far as the owner’s reputational 
gain is concerned, suing Mary and evicting her and her child 
from her house may actually have a powerful deterrent effect 
on potential infringers. They will perceive the owner as deter-
mined and merciless and stay away from his copyrighted con-
tent. Going after the pirate company is unlikely to generate the 
same reputational effect. The owner consequently will sue 
Mary and will make no effort to sue the company. This choice 
runs against society’s interest, while the owner takes full ad-
vantage of the copyright enforcement system subsidized by so-
ciety. 
Other copyright owners will act in the same way. Instead 
of making a sustained effort at apprehending and suing ram-
pant infringers, they will file easily winnable suits against de-
fendants who are readily identifiable. This selection of infring-
ers does not advance the social purpose of the copyright law’s 
high-penalty mechanism. In fact, it frustrates this purpose be-
cause it sends rampant violators a signal that they can proceed 
with business as usual by making themselves difficult to identi-
fy. A relatively moderate, and sometimes even small, invest-
ment in the violator’s detection-avoidance strategy will turn the 
copyright owners’ attention to easy targets. The owners’ incen-
tive to enforce the law in this way is perfectly rational and easi-
ly understandable. What is less understandable—and also less 
rational from society’s viewpoint—is the courts’ decision to co-
operate with these owners.  
The courts’ approach has produced numerous distortions. 
Those distortions fit into the hypothetical scenario where Mary 
pays with her house for the wrongs of copyright mega-pirates. 
Professors Pamela Samuelson and Tara Wheatland have as-
sembled and insightfully analyzed those distortions in a recent 
article.163 The authors recommend that courts align their 
awards of statutory copyright damages with the rules of due 
 
 160. ($30,000 × 5) − $5000 = $145,000. 
 161. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 704.730(a)(1) (West 2009) (capping 
California’s homestead exemption for a single house owner at $75,000). 
 162. The owner’s net gain from the suit will then be $120,000 ($200,000 − 
$75,000 − $5000). 
 163. Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 159, at 442–43, 462–63. 
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process that control the imposition of punitive damages in the 
area of torts.164 If adopted, this proposal will improve the exist-
ing state of affairs immensely. The improvement, however, will 
not be attained for free. To satisfy constitutional due process, 
an award of punitive damages must not be disproportionate to 
the victim’s actual damage.165 Specifically, it must conform to 
the Supreme Court’s “single-digit ratio” standard that deems 
unconstitutional virtually any award of punitive damages that 
exceeds the victim’s actual damage by ten times or more.166 
This conformity and all other relevant aspects of due process 
are subject to the de novo review of appellate courts.167 The 
proposed reform consequently will increase the costs of adjudi-
cating copyright damages. The increased volume of litigation 
over the plaintiffs’ actual damages—the benchmark for deter-
mining the constitutionality of the punitive damage awards—
will be particularly costly.  
These new expenditures might well be a good investment. 
Our society values creativity: it strives to be innovative rather 
than stagnant in developing new works, ideas, products, and 
markets.168 For this society, therefore, a strong copyright pro-
tection is necessary even when it is expensive to maintain. At 
some point, however—and it may well be that our courts have 
already reached this point—a more strategic approach may be-
come an economic necessity. 
Courts may apply the strategic model to copyright en-
forcement by imposing a uniform high penalty (or a range of 
high penalties) on the worst category of rampant infringers. All 
other violators will not be exempt from suits but they will only 
be required to pay the copyright owner compensatory damages. 
 
 164. Id. at 464–73. 
 165. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 581–83 (1996). 
 166. See id.; see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 
408, 425 (2003) (“Single-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due 
process . . . .”). 
 167. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 436 
(2001) (“[C]ourts of appeals should apply a de novo standard of review when 
passing on district courts’ determinations of the constitutionality of punitive 
damages awards.”). 
 168. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
546 (1985) (noting that copyright laws assist in the creation of new works); Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (“[Copy-
right protection] is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors by the provision of a special reward . . . .”); see also Parchomovsky & 
Stein, supra note 152, at 1517 (“[Copyright protection’s] raison d’être is to 
enrich the domain of expression and thereby improve the well-being of society.”). 
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This system will induce copyright owners to concentrate their 
enforcement efforts on rampant infringers, thereby increasing 
the probability that those infringers will be apprehended and 
penalized. The increased probability of being forced to pay the 
high penalty will induce some of those infringers to downscale 
their encroachment of the owners’ protected domains. This in-
ducement will set the cascaded-retreat dynamic in motion. The 
infringers will begin their exodus from the worst or “rampant” 
category and lower the intensity of their activities to the safe-
harbor zone. On their way down, they will be periodically re-
ducing the level of copyright infringement that qualifies as 
worst or rampant. There will be an equilibrium point at which 
this downscaling process will be discontinued. It is not possible 
to predict where this point will be. However, it is reasonable to 
anticipate a substantial reduction in the volume of copyright 
violations. Most important, society will be able to achieve this 
reduction at a relatively low cost.169 
To put this proposal into effect, it is necessary to articulate 
the criteria for the “worst” or “rampant” copyright violations. 
As in cases previously discussed, these criteria are all-inclusive. 
An infringer can be identified as “worst” or “rampant” by the 
number of his infringements—for example, by the number of 
copyrighted works he unlawfully downloaded from the Inter-
net170—by the size of his illicit gain, by the magnitude of the 
damage he caused the copyright owner, or by any combination 
of those factors.171 The strategic model does not prescribe any 
 
 169. Copyright owners would still be able to sue and recover compensation 
from average and small-time infringers. To be entitled to this compensation, 
however, an aggrieved copyright owner would have to prove her actual damages. 
 170. The expert-assisted pooling of information by copyright owners indi-
cates that this criterion is technologically implementable. See, e.g., Paramount 
Pictures Corp. v. Hopkins, No. 5:07-CV-593, 2008 WL 314541, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 4, 2008) (attesting that Paramount, the world’s leading motion picture 
studio, retained MediaSentry to indentify individual copyright violators); Sony 
Pictures Home Entm’t Inc. v. Chetney, No. 5:06-CV-227, 2007 WL 655772, at *1 
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (describing how Sony retained MediaSentry to “combat 
infringers” who use the Internet to download Sony’s copyrighted materials). 
 171. Copyright enforcement faces a serious problem of collectability that 
none of the three models can resolve. Many Internet companies that facilitate 
or directly engage in copyright piracy are basically insolvent, and numerous 
individual infringers reside overseas and are practically immune from suits. 
See, e.g., Napster Files for Bankruptcy, BBC NEWS (June 3, 2002, 16:17 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2023201.stm (announcing that Napster, a 
pioneer in technology that made it possible for Internet surfers to download 
copyrighted music, had declared bankruptcy and would be bought as part of a 
settlement resolving multiple suits against it). 
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particular criteria for identifying the “worst” violators. Instead, 
it allows policymakers to select one, or a combination, of those 
criteria. 
  CONCLUSION   
“‘And-not’”—said Karl Llewellyn—“is bad [j]urispru-
dence.”172 His point was that lawmakers’ choices do not present 
themselves in reality as a small set of mutually exclusive pos-
sibilities.173 When a legal system is unable to enforce one of its 
rules in a comprehensive fashion, it need not automatically 
switch to a randomized mode by apprehending a few violators 
out of many and penalizing them severely enough to deter all 
the rest. This switch has been—and still is—the American legal 
system’s modus operandi. It has existed long enough to create 
path dependence. Path dependence, however, is not a good rea-
son for policymakers to forestall the assessment of other en-
forcement options. With this in mind, this Article developed an 
alternative method of enforcing the law—the strategic model—
and identified the conditions under which it might outperform 
the comprehensive and the randomized models. The extent to 
which this theoretical prediction will materialize on the ground 
is an empirical question. To answer this question, the legal sys-
tem will have to test the strategic model in real-life settings. 
 
 172. WILLIAM L. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 
app. C, at 516 (1973) (including portions of Karl Llewellyn’s unpublished 
course materials titled Extracts from Law in Our Society: A Horse-Sense 
Theory of the Institution of Law). 
 173. See id. 
